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Personal political ideology can be a source of inter-personal frictions and affect working 
relationships. In this study, I introduce the construct of firm-level Political Ideological 
Divergence at the Top (PID) – the difference in the personal political ideologies of the CEO and 
that of the board of directors – and examine the impact that PID has on a firm’s reporting quality. 
My results suggest that PID increases the level of monitoring that the board of directors impose 
on the CEO and improve financial reporting quality. In-depth analysis reveals PID between the 
CEO and non-executive directors can improve financial reporting quality while PID between the 
CEO and the independent chairman can sometimes lead to reduced financial reporting quality. I 
also find that PID is associated with an increase in the CEO’s donations to individuals and 
organizations that are not aligned with her political ideology during her tenure. Lastly, I find 
evidence that suggests firms with higher levels of PID have earnings announcements that are 
more informative and management earnings forecasts that are more credible. This study 
documents the first evidence that differences in personal beliefs of the CEO and the personal 
beliefs of directors can affect firm behavior, and that CEOs may actively take steps to mitigate 
such differences.  
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1. Introduction 
The last four decades have seen an increase in political polarization in the United 
States of America – the divide between the Democratic and Republican parties has 
increased as their stances on political and social issues have become more diametrically 
opposite of the other’s (greater issue identification) – and members of the public have 
become better sorted between parties based on this increased issue identification 
(Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). This has resulted in an increased correlation between 
policy views and partisan identification (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008) and a strengthening 
of conflicts between individuals identified with either party (86% of Americans polled 
agreed that the conflicts between Democrats and Republicans are either strong or very 
strong; Pew Research Center, 2017).  
In this study, I introduce the concept of political ideology divergence between the 
members of the board of directors and the CEO (PID) and investigate the impact that PID 
can have on a firm’s financial reporting quality. Conceptually, PID represents the 
potential for conflicts to arise between the CEO and the board of directors due to 
differences in personal beliefs and ideologies. I posit that these conflicts distance the 
CEO from the board of director s and hypothesize that PID provides extra non-pecuniary 
incentives for directors to increase the level of monitoring levied on the CEO, thereby 
improving the financial reporting quality of the firm.  
CEOs are public figures who represent the corporations that they lead. In the past, 
CEOs tended to shy away from making public political statements. In recent years, 
however, CEOs of public and private firms have become increasingly public about 
making their political ideology known (McGregor, 2016) and such actions can come at a 
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cost to their firms (DeMers, 2017). Howard Schultz of Starbucks, Ed Bastian of Delta 
Airlines, Tim Cook of Apple, Satya Nadella from Microsoft, Doug McMillon of 
Walmart, and Edward Stack are just some of the prominent CEOs who have spoken out 
publicly to voice their opinion on political issues in recent years. When these CEOs speak 
up, they tend to voice their personal opinions and values which may or may not be 
aligned with the political position of the firm or the board of directors. When asked 
recently about CEOs voicing their political opinions, Ed Sebastian, CEO of Delta 
Airlines, comments that “it’s not a place where the board should tell you what to do… 
you either believe in your values or you don’t” (Kowitt, 2018). PID may also result from 
the political ideologies of the board of directors. For example, Howard Schultz, while 
being Chairman of Starbucks, often voiced a fiscally conservative, socially liberal 
opinion that isn’t entirely in line with Starbucks’ liberal culture (Neslon, 2019).   
The board of directors of a firm serves a two-fold function: to monitor the 
activities of the top management team and to provide advice to them (Jensen, 1993). The 
presence of social ties between the CEO and the board of directors erodes the 
independence of these directors and lowers the amount of monitoring that the board 
levies on the CEO (Westphal, 1999; Hoitash, 2001; Hoitash, 2014) essentially turning 
these directors into friendly directors. Directors can become friendly with the CEO from 
having similar backgrounds or demographics or from having experience in the same 
institutions. However, to my knowledge, there has not been a study that investigates how 
personal beliefs may result in conflicts that affect the friendliness and working 
relationship between the CEO and the board of directors, and the possible consequences 
that such personal belief differences can have on the firm.  
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While similarities in personal ideology held by different individuals can cause 
them to become friendly to one another, differences in personal ideology can create rifts 
between them. Such differences also increase the social distance between individuals, 
thus reducing the tendency of individuals to cooperate and collude. The ideology-conflict 
hypothesis suggests that an individual becomes less tolerant of other individuals who 
hold opposing ideologies (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, and Wetherell, 2014). 
Ideological differences also affect in-group identification and how individuals interact 
with members perceived as not being in the in-group (Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 
1994). It has also been documented that perceived differences in political ideologies 
cause value-conflicts and result in prejudice (Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson, 2013).  
My study is the first which investigates the existence of political ideological 
divergence (PID) among the top decision makers of a firm and shows that belief 
differences impact firm behavior (specifically, financial reporting quality). I find that 
increased PID is associated with better financial reporting quality, which supports the 
hypothesis that PID may improve the level of monitoring imposed on the CEO by the 
board of directors. My results also suggest that PID between the CEO and different types 
of directors may impact financial reporting quality differently. On the whole, PID 
between the CEO and independent directors have a stronger positive impact on the firm’s 
financial reporting quality, consistent with the expectation that the non-executive 
directors are more likely to respond to personal differences to monitor the CEO more, as 
their primary income is not tied to the firm in which they serve as a director. For instance, 
I find evidence that PID between the CEO and independent directors has a stronger 
positive association with accruals quality than PID between the CEO and the entire 
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board. However, there are specific situations where the PID between the CEO and 
executive directors has a stronger impact (e.g., misstatement). I find that earnings 
persistence and the market response to earnings announcements are stronger in firms with 
higher levels of PID. Lastly, I also find evidence that a firm’s earnings announcements 
are more informative for firms with higher PID, and higher levels of PID increase the 
credibility of management earnings forecasts released by a firm. These findings are 
consistent with the concept that PID is associated with better corporate governance. 
These result document the effects that differences in the opinions and beliefs held by 
directors and the CEO can have on a firm’s reporting behavior and extends the extant 
corporate governance literature. 
My paper deviates from prior literature by investigating the differences in 
political ideologies of different decision makers in a firm as a potential source of mistrust 
and conflict and documents the impact that such differences in personal values and 
personal beliefs can have on a firm. A possible limitation of the extant literature on the 
CEO – Board relationship is that these studies utilize friendliness proxies that are 
essentially lop-sided (bounded by neutral and friendly) and is unable to provide a 
definitive commentary on whether negative friendliness can enhance corporate 
governance. The design of my study allows for the study of the implications of a possibly 
unfriendly board resulting from personal conflicts. The findings of my study show that 
decision makers and stakeholders should not be viewed as a homogenous group when 
considering the political ideology landscape of a firm and that differences in political 
beliefs, not just the political culture of a firm, can have an impact on a firm’s behavior. 
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Additionally, differences in personal beliefs between different groups of stakeholders in a 
firm can have different effects.  
In supplementary analyses, I also investigate the determinants of an incoming 
CEO’s political ideology and find that the previously reported impact that the outgoing 
CEO has on the incoming CEO’s political ideology becomes insignificant once industry 
effects are controlled for. A number of extant studies utilize a CEO’s contemporaneous 
political donations while in office to proxy for her political ideology. However, a concern 
may be that a CEO’s donation behavior while in office may be opportunistic in nature 
and may not represent her true beliefs. I find results in my supplementary analyses that 
support the validity of such concerns. My results indicate that CEOs are more likely to 
donate make donations when PID levels are higher, and these donations are more likely 
to go to the opposite party, ostensibly in an opportunistic act with the aim of smoothing 
out relations or reducing the level of personal conflicts with the board of directors. 
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
related extant literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data sample. 
Section 4 describes analytical methods and provides results. Section 5 describes the 
supplementary analyses, and Section 6 concludes and discusses the limitations of this 
study as well as future avenues of research. 
2. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses 
2.1 The impact of political ideology on business organizations 
Individuals, including corporate decision makers, differ widely in their political 
ideologies (Francia et al., 2005; Jost, 2006, etc.). Individuals with political ideologies that 
correspond with either one of the two major political parties in the United States 
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(Democratic or Republican) will share similar viewpoints with others holding the same 
ideology, while they are likely to have different and possibly conflicting viewpoints with 
individuals who hold the opposite political ideology.  
Three streams in the extant finance and management literatures examine the 
impact that political ideology of top decision makers and other stakeholders within a firm 
has on firm policies and performance. The first centers around examining the impact that 
political ideology of the CEO has on the firm. Hutton et al. (2010) document that firms 
managed by CEOs with Republican ideologies are associated with lower levels of 
corporate debt, lower capital and R&D expenditures, and undertake less risky 
investments but benefit from higher levels of profitability. They also find that the impact 
that these (conservative) managers have on their firm’s policy becomes more pronounced 
after events that increase uncertainty. Chin et al. (2013) documents that more liberal-
leaning CEOs are more likely to emphasize CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) 
efforts in the firms that they manage and emphasize CSR even when recent firm 
performance is low, in contrast to conservative-leaning CEOs whose firms have CSR 
policies that are more responsive to recent firm performance. They also document that a 
firm’s PAC’s (Political Action Committee) 1 donation activities are significantly related 
to the CEO’s political ideology.  
The second set of political ideology studies examines the impact that the political 
ideology of non-CEO stakeholders of a firm has on the firm. Christensen et al. (2015) 
investigate the impact that the average political ideology of the top management (non-
director) team has on a firm’s risk strategies and find that the firms with a top 
                                                 
1 Corporations cannot donate directly to a political candidate, but often form PACs, through which they can 
raise funds for political candidates.  
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management team that on average hold Republican ideologies experience lower levels of 
corporate tax avoidance and argue that this reflects a lower risk tolerance in such firms 
due to the conservative nature of the management team’s political ideology.  
Guili and Kostovetsky (2014) find that firms with an overall Democratic-leaning 
political climate are likely to invest more in CSR activities. Gupta et al. (2017) extend 
Chin et al. (2013), concluding that the overall political ideology of a firm’s employees is 
also associated with the CSR efforts of the firm. They document that firms with a greater 
fraction of employees who hold Democratic ideologies are associated with a higher 
propensity to adopt more “progressive” firm policies such as the having women in the top 
management team and providing domestic partner benefits to employees. Gupta and 
Wowak (2017) find that the political ideologies of the members of the board of directors 
can impact the compensation contracts of the CEO. Boards that on average hold 
Republican ideologies are associated with higher levels of CEO pay, but the pay-
performance sensitivity is higher when compared to the pay-performance sensitivity of 
firms governed by boards that on average hold Democratic ideologies. Chin and 
Semadeni (2016) find that the more liberal CEOs are associated with greater pay equality 
within the top management team, but the liberalism of the compensation committee 
members is not significantly associated with pay equality.  
While the above-mentioned studies investigate the impact of the political 
ideologies of a segment of the individuals in a firm separately (i.e. CEO, management 
team, directors, and employees), a third set of political ideology studies investigates 
political ideologies from a firm-level basis, attributing a singular political ideology to the 
firm based on the ideologies of the individuals who comprise the firm. Guili and 
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Kostovetsky (2014) construct a firm-level based measure of political affiliation by 
applying principal component analysis to each of the following measures of political 
ideology: the political ideology of the CEO, the political ideology of the founding CEO, 
the political ideology of the board of directors, and the external political environment of 
the state in which the firm is headquartered in.  
Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2015) construct a firm-level measure of political 
culture by examining the political donations of the firm’s management team, PAC, and 
lower ranked employees, as well as the political donations of the residents of the state in 
which the firm is headquartered. They find that firms that hold a Democratic culture are 
more likely to face securities fraud and intellectual property rights litigation than firms 
with a Republican culture, while firms with a Republican culture are more likely to face 
civil rights, labor rights, and environmental protection lawsuits.  
The previously mentioned studies all take the approach of distilling a singular 
political ideology out of the firm and investigate the impact of that political ideology on 
various aspects of a firm. This approach essentially reduces the firm’s decision makers 
and stakeholders to a homogenous body with a uniform political ideology that is the 
mean or median of the firm. My dissertation deviates from prior literature by 
investigating the differences in political ideologies of different decision makers in a firm 
as a potential source of mistrust and conflict and investigates the impact that such 
differences can have on a firm. I recognize that individual political ideologies deviate 
from the median of the group and not every individual in a firm maintains a political 
ideology that is the same as the “political culture” of a firm. How individual decision 
makers are distributed on the spectrum of political ideologies can have effects 
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incremental to that of the firm’s political culture. My study differs from studies like Guili 
and Kostovetsky (2014) and Hutton et al. (2015) as the variable of interest in their papers 
is the overall political affiliation or political culture of the firm, while the variable of 
interest in my paper is the level of misalignment or conflict between the political 
ideologies of the CEO and the board of directors (and the management team).  
2.2 Role of the board of directors 
  The board of directors is an important determinant of the quality of the corporate 
governance of a firm, and it is unsurprising that there is an extensive stream of literature 
that examines the effect that the composition, structure, activity, and size of the board of 
directors has on their firms (e.g., Shivadasani, 1993; Carcello et al., 2000). More recent 
research focuses on the characteristics of the members of the board of directors. A 
growing stream of literature documents that the personal characteristics of the members 
of the board of directors, not only the size and fraction of outside directors, has an impact 
on various aspects of the firm. Srinidhi et al. (2014) document that firms with female 
directors have higher quality financial reporting.  Krishnan et al. (2011) find that firms 
with directors with legal expertise on the board have better financial reporting quality and 
Guner et al. (2008) find that firms with directors with financial expertise have greater 
financing but undertake poorer investments. 
The board of directors exists both to monitor the activity of the management team 
and provide advice to the management team (Adam and Ferreira, 2007; Coles et al., 
2008; Hsu and Hu, 2009; Adam, 2010). However, the board of directors is often not fully 
independent of the CEO. Due to their career concerns, executive directors (who also 
serve as officers in the firm) have to consider the interests of the CEO in addition to the 
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interests of the shareholders and may levy lower than nominal levels of monitoring on the 
CEO due to this conflict of interest . Independent directors, on the other hand, may be 
less susceptible to moral hazard because they do not derive as much of their income from 
the firm (Ryan 2004). An extensive and well-established stream of literature documents 
how the presence of independent (non-management) directors on the board improves 
various aspects of firms such as CEO turnover-performance sensitivity (e.g., Weisbach, 
1998; Knyazeva et al., 2013), adoption of anti-takeover devices (Brickley et al., 1994), 
operating performance and firm value (Kynazeva, 2013).  
2.3 Political ideology and inter-personal relationships 
 A rich stream of literature that investigates the effect that political 
ideology can have on personal relationships exists in the fields of political science and 
sociology. Of particular relevance are the studies that investigate political homophily. 
Political homophily refers to the tendency of individuals to form connections with others 
who hold politically similar views (Gerber, Henry, and Lubell, 2013). Among its other 
effects on enhancing interpersonal interactions, political homophily has been shown to 
encourage positive interactions between people at various levels, from the selection of 
childhood friends (Kandel, 1978) and the selection of a partner for a relationship (Huber 
and Malhotra, 2017), to collaboration between local governments (Gerber et al., 2013). In 
a recent study, Lee, Lee, and Nagarajan (2014) show that political homophily between 
the CEO and the board of directors has negative implications for firm performance and 
valuation, and that the likelihood that fraud would be committed.  
Another stream of literature investigates the detrimental effects that political 
ideology conflicts may have on inter-personal relationships. The ideology-conflict 
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hypothesis suggests that an individual becomes less tolerant of other individuals who 
hold opposing ideologies (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, and Wetherell, 2014). 
Ideological differences also affect in-group identification and how individuals interact 
with members perceived as not being in the in-group (Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, 
1994). It has also been documented that perceived differences in political ideologies 
cause value-conflicts and result in prejudice (Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson, 2013). 
Taken together, extant literature suggests a greater potential for conflict to exist between 
individuals with divergent political ideologies.  
2.4 Board friendliness and Monitoring 
Extant corporate governance literature documents the effects that friendly 
directors and directors who are co-opted (dominated) by the CEO can have on the firm. 
Directors who are friendly to the CEO may make concessions to the CEO, or otherwise 
not monitor the CEO as closely as directors who are not as friendly. Coles et al. (2014) 
find that a higher number of independent board members who were hired after the CEO 
was appointed is associated with lower levels of monitoring – turnover-performance 
sensitivity is reduced, and CEO pay is inflated. In the same manner, a board of directors 
with political ideology convergence with the CEO may also monitor the CEO less. 
Hoitash (2014) finds that boards with more directors having social ties with the CEO are 
more likely to offer higher levels of compensation to the CEO. Social ties between the 
Board and the CEO is also associated with higher levels of earnings management. 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) find that audit committees in which members have 
social ties with the CEO chromechrom audit services and audits are less likely to flag 
going concerns or internal control weaknesses. Overall, friendliness between the Board 
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and the CEO has been shown to be associated with CEO rent extraction behavior. The 
extant literature utilizes common experiences and participation in common organizations 
as proxies for social ties, and it is unclear whether similarities or differences in personal 
beliefs can affect these professional relationships.  
2.5 Conflict vs friendliness 
 The constructs of conflict and friendliness, while appearing to be two ends of a 
spectrum, should be given consideration as two separate constructs. Conflict consists of 
oppositions between individuals, whereas friendships describe close personal 
relationships between individuals. These two constructs are not mutually exclusive. 
Conflicts can arise between friends and non-friends and conflict may result in the 
dissolution, and under certain conditions, the initiation of friendships (Hartup and Shantz, 
1995). It is possible for a conflict-free relationship to not be friendly, and a friendliness-
free relationship to not have conflict. My study focuses on the potential of ideology 
differences to cause conflict but acknowledges that on average, conflict can have a 
detrimental effect on friendly relations. 
2.6 Hypothesis 
  The political ideology of a decision maker in a firm, consistent with prior 
literature, is defined as the degree to which the decision maker agrees with and supports 
the political ideologies espoused by the Democratic (liberal) or Republican (conservative) 
political parties. I define Political Ideology Divergence (PID) as the difference between 
the political ideology of a CEO of a firm and the political ideology of the firm’s directors. 
PID conceptually captures the degree to which the personal ideology of the chief decision 
maker (CEO) conflicts with the personal ideologies of other top decision makers in the 
firm (independent and executive directors). 
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PID – the level of belief and value differences between the CEO measures both 
the friendliness and unfriendliness of directors on the board. A higher level of PID 
between two individuals causes both individuals to have lower opinions of the other 
(Chambers et al., 2013). Thus, high PID in the firm may lead to members of the board of 
directors having lower opinions of the CEO, and vice versa, which may lead to higher 
levels of mistrust and conflict between them. This may stem from an increased social 
distance between the CEO and the board of directors, which may result in the CEO being 
more likely to subject to an out-group bias by members of the board of directors with an 
opposing political ideology (Tajfel, 1970), and vice versa.  
Therefore, I predict that higher levels of PID should induce the board to impose a 
higher level of monitoring on the CEO, which would lead to better corporate governance 
and higher financial reporting quality: 
H1: Increased political ideology divergence between the CEO and the board 
of directors results in better financial reporting quality. 
Increased monitoring due to increased PID is not a given. First, it is possible that 
the professional setting of the boardroom induces directors and CEOs to prevent personal 
biases or beliefs from influencing their working relationships. Second, if political 
ideological differences affect the working relationships between the directors and the 
CEO, such rifts in the CEO – Board relationship may induce the CEO to withhold 
information from the board, and thus reduce monitoring efficacy as well as future firm 
performance. Adam and Ferreira (2007) present an analytical model in which the efficacy 
of the board of directors in both advisory and monitoring roles is impacted by the degree 
of friendliness between the CEO and the board of directors. In their model, a firm with a 
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board of directors who is friendly towards the CEO can be more effective in both roles as 
directors depend on the CEO for information and the CEO is less likely to share 
information with the board if she perceives that this information would be used against 
her. In addition, it is possible that the effect that PID has on monitoring is partially 
mediated through the negative impact that conflict between the CEO and the board of 
directors has on friendly relations (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Effect of conflict on monitoring 
  
While I acknowledge this possibility, I do not investigate this causal channel due 
to difficulties measuring the contemporary friendliness of the CEO and the board of 
directors – extant literature on board friendliness utilize personal characteristics and 
historical experiences that are not contemporaneous in nature.  
3. Data 
To calculate a decision maker’s political ideology, I utilize the historical 
individual donations data provided by the Federal Election Commission on their bulk 
data website matched with executive employment tenures in the Boardex database. To 
calculate firm fundamentals and stock market performance, Compustat and CRSP are 
respectively utilized. Board and CEO characteristics are compiled using Boardex, and 
Execucomp. Institutional holdings information from Thompson Reuters and information 
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about analyst coverage from IBES are utilized as well. State level political divergence is 
calculated from FEC donation data as well.  
A complete list of donations made by individuals to political candidates and 
political action committees is collected from the FEC’s website2. The FEC provides a 
complete list of donations received from individuals dating back to 1980. In this study, 
individual donation data from 1980 to 2017 is utilized to construct an individual’s 
political ideology. This data lists an individual’s first and last name, donation amount, 
employer, as well as the political committee to which the donation was made. The FEC 
also provides the political alignment of each election committee in a separate dataset 
(Republican, Democratic, Libertarian, Green, Independent, or Unknown). A complete list 
of PACs is also collected from the FEC’s website. Federal law defines a PAC as any 
organization that contributes $1000 or more to an election campaign.  
The final sample consists of the intersection of the databases used consisting of 
firm-year observations with the fiscal year end that is between 2000 and 2018.  
Table 1a, 1b, and 1c provide descriptive statistics of the various variables used in 
this study.  
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev Mean 
ΔAbn DD2002 6879 -0.02000 -0.00074 0.01834 0.04963 -0.00136 
Abn DD2002 7126 0.00948 0.02244 0.04611 0.04396 0.03689 
Analyst Coverage 7331 1.57240 2.20727 2.76689 0.76772 2.13747 
CEO Chair 8310 0 0 1.0000000 0.4959144 0.4359807 
CEO Compensation 5983 1758.15000 4212.59000 8886.24000 9418.73000 7383.61000 
CEO_Current_Donate 4668 -0.43748 0.00000 0.00000 0.31361 -0.08001 
CEO Ideo 9553 -0.43745 0.00000 0.03125 0.32445 -0.06549 
Out CEO Ideo 9405 -0.43740 0.00000 0.00000 0.30361 -0.05712 
CEO Delta 9553 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 357.98948 105.76876 
CEO Vega 9553 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 108.24792 29.26386 
                                                 
2 Federal Election Comission website bulk data page. https://www.fec.gov/data/advanced/?tab=bulk-data  
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Dacc 7055 -0.06711 -0.00372 0.05799 0.69903 -0.05621 
DAcc Change 6643 -0.10763 0.00165 0.11434 1.20720 -0.00812 
ΔDD2002 6048 -0.00928 -0.00041 0.00599 0.03137 -0.00168 
DD2002 6361 0.04181 0.06974 0.11490 0.07575 0.09188 
Demand Ext Fin 9553 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.29488 0.09620 
ΔDisAgg 9364 -0.01694 0.00018 0.01763 0.04196 0.00071 
DisAgg 9510 0.75626 0.81579 0.85491 0.09527 0.79433 
Earnings BA response 8801 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 0.00343 0.00009 
Earnings CAR 
response 8945 -0.03288 0.00045 0.03568 0.07384 0.00125 
Earnings Surp 7176 -0.00078 0.00036 0.00196 0.04419 -0.00529 
Earnings Vol response 9030 0.80242 2.18100 4.70458 5.03081 3.81268 
ΔF-Score 6778 -0.51889 -0.02418 0.51464 1.53833 -0.00763 
F-Score 6967 5.24760 6.95137 8.32445 2.09486 6.72284 
ΔFog 3804 -0.54466 0.05966 0.72475 2.21725 -0.06253 
Fog 4137 18.67789 19.52257 20.53257 2.01018 19.61190 
Leverage 9485 0.42565 0.59023 0.77142 0.24845 0.59446 
Loss Prop 8774 0.00000 0.00000 0.40000 0.31160 0.20773 
MTB 9484 1.19979 1.92605 3.24938 4.07850 2.84030 
Op CFO Vol 8402 36.21312 115.65940 390.24440 1455.60000 551.56764 
ΔPIDWhole 9405 -0.00001 0.00000 0.01094 0.10679 0.02721 
PIDWhole 9553 0.06249 0.29804 0.43583 0.18647 0.25645 
ΔPIDChair 9405 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.13518 0.00758 
PIDChair 5930 0.00000 0.00000 0.31955 0.23907 0.14737 
ΔPIDNon-Ex 9405 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.14921 0.01487 
PIDNon-Ex 9553 0.04678 0.23650 0.43745 0.22343 0.26289 
ΔPIDEx 9405 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.12751 -0.00156 
PIDEx 9553 0.00000 0.00000 0.00787 0.16740 0.07615 
Report Length 4098 9.99337 10.36559 10.75775 0.79379 10.30641 
ΔReport Lag 9192 -0.04652 -0.02151 0.07146 0.16499 0.00873 
Report Lag 9356 3.40120 3.71357 4.02535 0.41118 3.70647 
Ret Vol 9520 0.07229 0.10121 0.15010 0.06959 0.12112 
ROA 9360 0.00397 0.03122 0.07230 0.15307 0.00751 
Sale Growth 9290 -0.03070 0.05228 0.14953 0.30571 0.08814 
Sale Vol 8727 79.06235 351.60309 1258.64000 5199.32000 1941.95000 
Size 9510 6.24812 7.67988 8.96463 2.07051 7.58253 
State Ideo 9442 -0.13192 -0.00413 0.12910 0.16481 0.00224 
Tangibility 9009 0.04472 0.16509 0.39032 0.24624 0.25008 
Torbin’s Q 9327 -0.93248 0.61071 1.96298 5.38901 0.06973 
Z-Score 7237 2.32171 366.02942 1812.00000 8154.97000 2899.01000 
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Table 1b: Descriptives for MEF regressions (Table 8) 
Variable N 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev Mean 
MEF CAR 
(0,1) 2844 -0.02783 0.002718 0.035553 0.063604 0.002446 
MEF 
Inaccuracy 2713 0.001189 0.00339 0.008287 0.015754 0.00842 
MEF Bias 2713 -0.00412 -0.00088 0.002071 0.015868 0.001025 
Horizon 2850 241 318 334 88.91893 273.9025 
Range 2850 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.116081 0.122229 
MTB 2845 0.241146 0.380596 0.590165 0.309041 0.447708 
Prev Loss 2850 0 0 0 0.289966 0.092632 
Bundled 2850 1 1 1 0.378299 0.827018 
Bundled Esurp 2850 0 0.000229 0.001142 0.002688 0.000708 
Abnormal 
Accruals 2522 -0.04469 0.010147 0.09977 0.515993 0.074539 
 
Table 1c: Descriptive statistics for additional control variables utilized in earnings 
persistence regressions (Table 9) 
Variable N 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev Mean 
ACC 9296 -0.03753 -0.00606 0.022932 0.058958 -0.00913 
DIV 9296 0 1 1 0.498935 0.533025 
Size 9296 6.642177 7.638385 8.805873 1.600547 7.772509 
MTB 9296 0.086831 0.669569 1.425222 1.306651 0.974178 
Age 9296 13 21 37 19.64471 27.01947 
SI 9296 -0.01231 -0.00244 0 0.033276 -0.01235 
Ret_Vol 9296 0.062204 0.086054 0.121683 0.053883 0.099557 
Earn_Vol 9296 19.55712 51.05808 157.9561 524.9911 217.9238 
NB_Seg 9296 3 6 12 5.36374 7.12812 
NG_Seg 9296 3 6 12 7.544049 8.508498 
 
4. Methodology and empirical results 
4.1 Proxying for CEO and director political ideologies.  
Using an approach similar to that of extant literature investigating the effect of a 
CEO’s political ideology (Hutton et al. 2010, Chin et al. 2013, Gupta et al. 2017, Gupta 
and Wowak 2017, etc.), I construct the measure for an executive’s political ideology in 
the following manner.  
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The individual donation data is matched with Boardex’s list of directors, 
executive officers, and senior managers in a firm by first and last name, as well as 
employer. Boardex breaks down the first and middle names of the executive and stores it 
in up to four first name variables (i.e. John Doe Smith will have John as first name 1 and 
Doe as first name 2, and Smith as the last name). I require an exact match of the 
donator’s last name with the officer’s last name, and that the first name matches exactly 
at least one of the four first name variables provided by Boardex. This is to allow for 
situations where a donor fills out her middle and last names on the donation data, rather 
than her first and last names. I also require a fuzzy match for employer names – the FEC 
employer name must contain the entirety of a shortened version of the Boardex employer 
name variable (e.g., Honeywell is the shortened version of Honeywell International). For 
situations where there are multiple matches, I utilize a procedure that determines the 
Levenshtein distance between the full names reported in the FEC data and in the Boardex 
data, and retain the match that has the shortest Levenshtein distance. In the event of the 
same Levenshtein distance between both full names, I utilize the same procedure to 
compare the employer name reported by the FEC and the employer name in the Boardex 
database and retain the match with the shortest distance. The above matching technique 
was selected to minimize false positive errors, which is intended to result in a less noisy 
independent variable of interest, although a limitation of requiring exact matches is a 
false negative rate that may be higher than a more accommodating fuzzy matching 
procedure. I opted to minimize false positives to reduce the possibility of spurious 
inferences that may result from a noisy independent variable of interest.  
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Since I am interested in potential conflicts and mistrust due to opposing personal 
political ideologies, third party and independent candidates are excluded from my 
measures in order to focus on Democratic and Republican ideologies, which are more 
often diametrically opposed on many issues. Only donations to committees clearly 
demarcated as Republican or Democratic are utilized for the calculation of political 
ideology, as they represent the most salient political divide in the political landscape in 
the United States. I include donations to Political Action Committees (PACs) with a clear 
party affiliation, party committees with clear party affiliations, and individual (non-third-
party) candidates in the construction of my measures. This treatment is consistent with 
prior literature utilizing political ideology (Hutton et al., 2010; Chin et al., 2013; Guili et 
al., 2014; Christensen et al., 2015; Gupta and Wowak, 2017; Gupta et al., 2017). Hutton 
et al. (2010) compares the political ideology derived from FEC donations data with the 
self-reported political ideologies of CEOs and find a significant correlation between these 
two measures, providing support that the voting behavior of CEOs prior to office is 
consistent with their self-reported political ideologies when in office.  
After matching the donations to specific top decision makers (CEO or director), I 
construct four measures which are the components of the executive’s ideology index. 
Since CEOs are highly visible public figures who are representative of the firm, there is a 
concern that the CEO may make political donations on behalf of the firm in an 
opportunistic manner to benefit her firm rather than in a manner that is reflective her 
personal political ideology. For example, a CEO heading firm in the defense industry 
may undertake personal donations to candidates in order to establish a personal political 
connection which may influence the award of defense contracts to the firm. Therefore, I 
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construct the political ideology variables for the top decision makers by utilizing the 
donations made in the 10 years prior to the year that they begin serving (t-10,t-1) as an 
executive or a director, following the approach of prior literature (Chin et al., 2013; Chin 
and Semadeni, 2016). For instance, if a CEO began her tenure on January 1st 2014, then 
all of her donations from 2004 to 2013 will be used to determine her political ideology. In 
this manner, the political ideology of the CEO is established prior to her service as the 
representative of the firm, minimizing the possibility that her donation pattern is driven 
by opportunistic donations on behalf of the firm, rather than her own personal political 
ideology.  
Following the same logic, I also exclude the subsequent tenures for CEOs who 
have served multiple terms as CEOs in the sample (i.e. if a CEO has served as CEO in 
three firms, only her earliest term as CEO in a firm will be utilized in the sample). 
Because directors are less closely associated with the firm and thus will have weaker 
incentive to donate on behalf of the firm (they are viewed either as senior employees or 
independent directors rather than as the leader and representative of the firm), and 
because doing so will exclude a substantial portion of the population, I do not exclude 
directors who have served as directors in other firms. One consequence of defining the 
political ideology of an executive or a director in this manner is that the political ideology 
of each executive or director remains static throughout her term in office. This also 
results in a lower observation count when compared to other political ideology research 
that utilize the contemporaneous donations of a CEO or director to determine their 
political ideology (e.g., Gupta et al., 2017; Gupta and Wowak, 2017). A minimum of one 
donation in the 10 year window is required in order for the ideology of a CEO or director 
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to be detected. However, the structure of the PID variables means that such individuals 
with a single donation will be assigned a weak political ideology when compared to other 
individuals who make multiple donations to the same party. 
The four components that I construct to assemble my political ideology measure 
are as follows: 1) number of donations to Democrats divided by the number of donations 
to both Democrats and Republicans; 2) the total dollar amount of donations to Democrats 
divided by the total dollar amount of donations to both Democrats and Republicans; 3) 
the number of years in which the executive made a donation to a Democrat, divided by 
the number of years that the executive made a donation to either a Democrat or a 
Republican; 4) the number of distinct Democratic committees donated to divided by the 
total number of distinct Democratic and Republican committees donated to. To handle 0 
values in all four measures, 0.1 is added to all numerators while 0.2 is added to all 
denominators so that a component with 0 values results in a neutral 0.5 ideology. Like 
prior literature (Chin et al., 2013, etc.), I find very high internal consistency between 
these four measures (Cronbach’s α > 0.99) which indicates that these four measures have 
high between-subject variability and low within-subjects variability. Therefore (following 
extant literature, e.g., Chin et al., 2013; Gupta and Wowak, 2017; Gupta et al., 2017) I 
utilize an average of these four measures as my final measure of an executive’s political 
ideology. Diverging from the procedure of prior literature, I then linearly transform the 
score of ideology to range between -0.5 and 0.5, instead of 0 to 1, by subtracting 0.5 from 
the score. In this manner, Democratic ideologies will be negative, while Republican 
ideologies will be positive. Having such a scale facilitates the construction of the PID 
scores and allows for easy interpretation of CEO and board ideologies. 
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The political ideology of a firm’s CEO and directors are matched to listings in the 
BoardEx database. Firm-year observations for which the political ideology of the CEO 
cannot be determined (matching of BoardEx information and the FEC donations data 
fails) are excluded from my sample.  
Some CEOs go on to serve as CEO in other firms after the end of their first tenure 
as CEO. I exclude such subsequent tenures from my sample. Boardex provides 69,608 
unique firm-first time CEO observations. After applying the ideology matching 
procedure, I end up with 9533 firm – CEO observations. This is a match rate of about 
14%.3  
The Boardex database provides 591,247 unique director – firm observations. The 
application of the matching procedure yields 119,346 successful matches, meaning that 
the ideology of the directors could be determined at the time of inception of their tenure 
as directors. This yields a success rate of just higher than 20%. The donation rate for 
directors appears to be quite similar to the donation rate for CEOs, providing further 
support that this measure captures the intrinsic political ideologies of the individuals 
rather than strategic donation behavior. For the 9553 firm-CEO observations, 8106 have 
at least one director who donated to either parties. This suggests that the matching 
algorithm properly detects director donations unless the director donates under a 
pseudonym.  
After merging the CEO’s historical donation information and requiring the firms 
to have non-missing CEO ideologies and appear in both CRSP and Compustat databases, 
I end up with 9,553 firm-year observations of 1,573 firms for years 2000 – 2017. I then 
                                                 
3 I randomly pick 30 CEOs that did not get assigned an ideology at random to verify that the matching 
procedure works.  
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calculate the political ideology for each director on the board of directors. The overall 
board ideology is calculated by averaging the ideologies of all board members. Board 
members without matched donation histories are assumed to have not donated and 
assigned a neutral ideology of 0. 4  
Figure 2a shows the distribution of CEO ideology. The distribution is trimodal in 
nature, with spikes towards both Democratic and Republican extremes, while around a 
third of the CEOs have an ideology about neutral (within -0.05 and 0.05)5. This 
distribution is similar to the distribution reported by Chin et al. (2013) who also utilize 
the donations for the 10 years prior to a CEO’s tenure to determine her political ideology. 
CEOs in my sample have a modal ideology of neutral. This is consistent with the 
observation that no party in recent history has held the office of President of the United 
States for more than three consecutive terms (Republicans held the office for 7 
consecutive terms immediately after independence, while Democrats held the office for 5 
consecutive terms around the great depression).  The polarization of the remaining non-
neutral CEOs towards both extremes is congruent with the observation of increased 
polarization among American elites as documented by Herrington (2009).   
  
                                                 
4 Board Members without matching historical donations within the 10 years prior to their tenure have either 
not donated or had not donated using her legal name and / or failed to provide a valid employer while 
donating. Failure to match can also be due to the recipient of the donations failing to report the above 
information correctly. However, based on the donation data, a sizeable fraction of these board members 
starts to donate after their tenure which hints that non-donation is the primary cause.  
5 The final sample that requires non-missing variables for the control variables also exhibit this trimodal 
distribution. 
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Figure 2a. Distribution of CEO ideologies 
 
 
Figure 2b. Distribution of Board ideologies 
 
Figure 2b shows the distribution of board ideology. This distribution is closer to a 
normal distribution but slightly skewed to the right. This slight bias towards Democratic 
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ideology is consistent with the slight bias towards Democratic ideology that is observed 
in Figure 2a as well. 
4.2 Political Ideology Divergence 
My primary measure of Political Ideology Divergence (PID) is as defined in the 
following equation: 
𝑃𝐼𝐷 = |(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜 − 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜)| 
CEO Ideo is the CEO’s political ideology, and Board Ideo is the board’s average political 
ideology, with political ideology as defined in the earlier section. PID ranges between 0 
and 1, with 0 representing perfectly convergent political ideologies between the CEO and 
the board of directors, and 1 representing perfectly divergent political ideologies between 
the CEO and the board of directors. This PID measure assumes that neutral directors will 
be a source of conflict for CEOs if the CEO is not also neutral. For example, a firm with 
a purely Democratic CEO and a purely Republican Board will have a PID of |-0.5 - 0.5| 
resulting in a PID of 1. Similarly, a firm with a purely Republican CEO and a purely 
Republican Board will have a PID of |0.5 - 0.5| resulting in a PID of 0.  
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Figure 2c. Distribution of PID between CEO and whole board 
 
Figure 2c shows the distribution of PID. The distribution seems to be bimodal, 
with a peak near 0 PID, and another peak close to the 0.5 mark. 0 PID happens when the 
board is completely aligned with the CEO, while one plausible scenario where 0.5 PID 
happens is when a completely partisan CEO is paired with a completely neutral board. 
Figure 2d shows the mean, max, and standard deviation of PID in my sample over time. 
While there was an increase at the turn of the millennium, PID seems to have remained 
quite consistent in the last 15 years. 
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Figure 2d: PID trend over time 
 
 I also utilize a second specification of PID, Opposite Director which counts the 
number of directors who have a political ideology that is opposite to that held by the 
CEO. For instance, if the CEO is Democratic (e.g., ideology score of -0.2), then PID is a 
count of the number of directors with Republican ideology (i.e. ideology score > 0). 
Similarly, in the situation where the CEO is Republican, (e.g., ideology score of -0.2), 
then PID counts the number of directors with Democratic ideology (i.e. ideology score < 
0). 
4.3 Determinants of CEO political ideology 
The main variable of interest in this study is the misalignment between the CEO’s 
political ideology and the political ideology of other top decision makers in the firm. I 
begin the analysis by investigating how some firm-level characteristics can influence the 
selection of CEOs who hold certain types of ideology. Utilizing CEO succession events 
(the first year in which a CEO takes office), I investigate the determinants of the 
incoming CEO’s political ideology using the following determinants model.  
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦௜,௧ =  𝛼 + βଵ𝑂𝑢𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧ +  βଶ𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧ + βଷ𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧ +
  βସ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ +  βହ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧௜௧ +  β଺𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛௜,௧ + β଻𝑅𝐷_𝐴𝑇௜,௧ + β଼𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ +
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βଽ𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑_%௜,௧ + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹 48 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀௜௧  
 (1) 
CEO Ideology is the political ideology of the CEO, calculated as described above. Out 
CEO Ideo is the political ideology of the previous CEO. State Ideo is the political 
ideology for the year within the state in which the firm’s headquarters is located, 
measured as the total amount donated to Democrats divided by the total amount donated 
to both Democrats and Republicans, transformed to range between -0.5 and 0.5. Leverage 
is firm leverage. ROA(Lagged) is the return on assets for the firm from the previous year. 
Loss(Lagged) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm experienced a loss in the 
previous year and 0 otherwise. RD_AT is the R&D expenditures scaled by the total assets 
of the firm. Foreign is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has foreign operations 
and 0 otherwise. Some industries are more partisan than others. Firms in internet-related 
industries and the entertainment industry lean towards Democrats while firms in firearms, 
mining and steel production, and construction materials industries lean towards 
Republican6. Therefore, the Fama-French 48 industries are included as controls. 
Board_Ideo is the average ideology of the board calculated in the manner described in the 
previous section. Board_Ind_% is the percentage of the board that is filled with 
independent directors. Boardsize is the log of the number of directors on the board. Table 
2 tabulates the results of the determinants model.  
  
                                                 
6 Most Heavily Partisan Industries. Opensecrets.org webpage available at 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/partisans.php accessed June 2018. 
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Table 2: Determinants of incoming CEO’s political ideology 
 
  OLS Tobit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES CEO Ideo CEO Ideo CEO Ideo CEO Ideo CEO Ideo CEO Ideo CEO Ideo CEO Ideo 
                  
Out CEO Ideo 0.169** 0.140** 0.115* 0.080 0.169** 0.140** 0.115* 0.080 
 (2.41) (2.05) (1.79) (1.19) (2.51) (2.08) (1.74) (1.21) 
State Ideo   0.383*** 0.277*** 0.233***   0.383*** 0.277*** 0.233*** 
   (6.21) (4.47) (3.44)   (6.23) (4.46) (3.51) 
Board Ideo    0.778*** 0.741***    0.778*** 0.741*** 
    (6.95) (6.18)    (6.86) (6.36) 
Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.26) (-0.45) (-0.18) (-0.40) (-0.25) (-0.45) (-0.18) (-0.40) 
Leverage 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.018 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.018 
 (0.16) (0.07) (0.28) (0.44) (0.17) (0.08) (0.28) (0.46) 
Foreign -0.046** -0.052*** -0.046** -0.008 -0.046** -0.052*** -0.046** -0.008 
 (-2.50) (-2.85) (-2.58) (-0.37) (-2.46) (-2.78) (-2.50) (-0.37) 
RD_AT 0.150 0.015 0.019 0.060 0.150 0.015 0.019 0.060 
 (1.31) (0.13) (0.18) (0.44) (1.49) (0.15) (0.20) (0.50) 
Board Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.01) (-0.09) (-0.31) (-0.20) (-0.02) (-0.10) (-0.33) (-0.21) 
Board Ind % -0.020 -0.011 0.007 0.049 -0.020 -0.011 0.007 0.049 
 (-0.18) (-0.10) (0.07) (0.44) (-0.18) (-0.10) (0.07) (0.45) 
Big 4 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 
 (3.06) (3.15) (3.04) (2.62) (3.22) (3.30) (3.20) (2.83) 
             
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
             
Industry Fixed Effects N N N Y N N N Y 
             
Observations 1,177 1,161 1,161 1,140 1,177 1,161 1,161 1,140 
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.042 0.079 0.075       
Degrees of Freedom       25 26 27 74 
Chi-Square         38.18 76.67 122.8 165.1 
Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1         
   Standard errors are clustered-robust at firm level for OLS regressions. Standard errors are robust for Tobit regressions. 
 
From the regression results of column 1, which excludes Board Ideo, State Ideo, and 
industry fixed effects, we see that the political ideology of the incoming CEO is 
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positively associated with the political ideology of the outgoing CEO. This is suggestive 
of CEOs picking successors who have similar political ideologies. Column 2 adds State 
Ideo to the regression and we see that the previous associations hold, but the significance 
of the positive relationship between the incoming CEO’s political ideology with that of 
the outgoing CEO is slightly weaker with the inclusion of State Ideo, which is shown as a 
strong predictor of the incoming CEO’s political ideology. In column 3, Board Ideo is 
added, and we see that the positive association between the incoming and outgoing 
CEOs’ political ideologies become weaker still and that Board Ideo is a stronger 
predictor of incoming CEO ideology than State Ideo. Column 4 introduces industry fixed 
effects that were excluded from the previous 3 columns. With the inclusion of industry 
fixed effects, the association between the political ideologies of incoming and outgoing 
CEOs is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the correlation between the 
incoming and outgoing CEO’s political ideology may be due to the needs of particular 
industries rather than due to the outgoing CEO’s efforts to select a successor who is 
similar to herself. In untabulated results, certain industries (using Fama French 48 
classifications) exhibit a preference for CEOs with Republican ideology, notably, the 
food production, healthcare, textiles, metal fabrication and defense industries. 7  
Unexpectedly, the electronics industry and the entertainment show a preference for CEOs 
with a Republican ideology and the only industry in my sample that prefers CEOs with 
Democratic ideology is the soda industry. From the results of the determinants regression, 
we see that the ideology of the incoming CEO is strongly positively correlated with both 
the ideology of the state where the headquarters is located, as well as the ideology of the 
                                                 
7 Compared to the baseline, which is Fama French industry number 1, Agriculture. 
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existing board of directors. This is suggestive that PID may not be actively sought by 
directors or shareholders, and that further investigation into the possibility of abnormal 
CEO ideology or abnormal PID may yield greater insight. Since CEO Ideo is a 
continuous variable that is bounded by -0.5 and 0.5, I also conduct regressions 1 to 4 
using Tobit regressions. The results of the Tobit regressions are similar and tabulated in 
columns 5 to 8. 
4.4 Determinants of firm-level PID 
Similarly, I investigate possible determinants of PID utilizing the following 
regression model: 
𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ = 𝛼 + βଵ𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑛௜,௧ +  βଶ𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧ + βଷ𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧ +  βସ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ +
 βହ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ +  β଺𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛௜,௧ +  β଻𝑅𝐷_𝐴𝑇௜,௧ + β଼𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ +
βଽ𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑_%௜,௧ + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐹𝐹 48 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀௜,௧   
   (2) 
Partisan is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO’s political ideology is in the top 
decile in terms of magnitude, regardless of whether she holds a Democratic or 
Republican ideology. The other variables are as previously defined. Since PID is a 
continuous variable that ranges from 0 to 1, I also conduct Tobit regressions in addition 
to OLS regressions. If CEOs prefer board members with agreeable political ideologies 
and actively (and successfully) select directors based on their political ideologies, then 
the regression coefficient for Partisan would be significant and negative. OLS 
regressions are tabulated in columns 1 to 4 in Table 3, while Tobit regressions are 
tabulated in columns 5 to 8.   
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Table 3: Determinants of PID (Between CEOs and entire board) 
 
 OLS Tobit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES PID PID PID PID PID PID PID PID 
               
Partisan 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 
  (22.27) (21.93) (22.06) (19.93) (31.17) (30.96) (31.02) (30.62) 
State Ideo   0.042 0.034 0.006  0.046*** 0.039*** 0.010 
    (1.46) (1.12) (0.21)  (3.62) (2.94) (0.76) 
Board Ideo    0.063 0.049   0.055** 0.039 
     (1.22) (0.94)   (2.21) (1.54) 
Size -0.005 -0.006* -0.006* -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.008*** 
  (-1.61) (-1.84) (-1.85) (-2.64) (-3.50) (-4.05) (-4.07) (-5.86) 
Leverage 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 
  (0.37) (0.42) (0.43) (0.30) (1.03) (1.14) (1.17) (1.15) 
Foreign 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.019* 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.019*** 
  (0.46) (0.36) (0.42) (1.69) (1.12) (0.85) (0.98) (4.06) 
RD_AT 0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.068 0.004 -0.008 -0.010 -0.077*** 
  (0.08) (-0.12) (-0.16) (-1.11) (0.18) (-0.39) (-0.48) (-3.19) 
Board Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 0.000 
  (-0.93) (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.14) (-1.80) (-1.65) (-1.66) (0.25) 
Board Independence -0.081 -0.068 -0.064 -0.079 -0.069*** -0.056** -0.052** -0.069*** 
  (-1.39) (-1.15) (-1.08) (-1.37) (-3.07) (-2.45) (-2.29) (-2.99) 
Big 4 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -0.010* -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 
  (-1.00) (-0.95) (-0.89) (-0.35) (-1.72) (-1.60) (-1.47) (-0.41) 
             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
             
Observations 8,715 8,606 8,606 8,505 8,715 8,606 8,606 8,505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.113 0.114 0.158      
Degrees of freedom       26 27 28 75 
Chi Square         1001 995.3 1000 1485 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
  Standard errors are clustered-robust at firm level for OLS regressions. Standard errors are robust for Tobit regressions. 
 
From the regression results tabulated in Table 3, Partisan is consistently a strong 
predictor of PID in all tested specifications, which suggests that CEOs do not, or are not 
fully able to determine the political ideology of the board of directors. We should not 
observe such strong positive correlations between Partisan and PID if CEOs were 
actively selecting directors who agree with them politically. PID does not seem to be 
associated with either State Ideo or Board Ideo after controlling for firm effects. In the 
better-specified Tobit regressions (columns 5 to 8), we see that PID is significantly 
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negatively correlated with Board Independence, which is suggestive of a possible 
substitution effect. If the primary purpose of independent directors is to monitor the 
firm’s executives, then this suggests that a board with a smaller percent of independent 
directors with a stronger political ideology divergence from the CEO may impose similar 
amounts of monitoring as a board with a larger percentage of independent directors with 
a weaker political ideology divergence.  
In untabulated results, 20 out of the 48 Fama French industries are associated with 
higher levels of PID (using agriculture as the baseline) including industries such as soda, 
entertainment, pharmaceuticals, textiles, steel works, defense, business services, retail, 
and insurance while only two, food production and fabricated products are associated 
with lower levels of PID. This suggests that there are industry-specific characteristics that 
can affect the levels of PID in firms.  
Impact of PID on Financial Reporting Quality 
I utilize four primary measures, DD2002, Abn DD2002, DAcc, and F-Score, to proxy 
financial reporting quality (FRQ) in my investigation of the impact that PID has on 
financial reporting quality. DD2002 is the standard deviation of the residuals of the 
regression of accruals on current operating cashflows, cashflows of one year prior and 
one year ahead, as well as current PPE levels as used in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
modified by Nichols (2002). Abn DD2002 uses the same model but captures the absolute 
deviation of a firm’s accruals’ quality from the industry standard.  
DAcc is the Discretionary (abnormal) accruals measure from the modified Jones 
(1991) model. F-Score is the composite score compiled in Dechow et al. (2011) as a 
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proxy for a firm’s ex-ante misstatement risk. Detailed definitions of DD2002, Abn 
DD2002, DAc,c and F-Score are provided in Appendix B.  
I utilize variations of the following regression model to test Hypothesis 1. 
𝐹𝑅𝑄௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  βଵ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ + βଶ𝐶𝑒𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟௜,௧ + βଷ𝑃𝐼𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝑒𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟 ௜,௧  +  βସ𝐶𝑒𝑜 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧ +
 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧ +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀௜,௧        
(3) 
Where FRQ is one of the proxies for financial reporting quality: DD2002, Abn DD2002, 
DAcc, F-Score. 
I utilize the following firm fundamental control variables as they have been 
documented in prior literature to affect financial reporting quality. Size (firm size), 
Leverage (leverage), ROA (return on assets), Loss_Prop (proportion of the last 5 years, t-
4, t reporting a loss), Foreign (dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has foreign 
operations), MTB (market to book ratio), SalesGrowth (sales growth), Cash Vol 
(cashflow volatility), Sales Vol (sales volatility), Ret Vol (stock returns volatility), Big 4 
(dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm utilizes a Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise), Busy 
Board (percentage of directors who are simultaneously on 3 boards of more), Board 
Independence (percentage of directors who are independent directors),  CEO Chair 
(dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise), CEO Tenure (natural log of CEO tenure), CEO Compensation (CEO total 
compensation), CEO Delta (sensitivity of CEO’s stock awards to stock price), CEO Vega 
(sensitivity of CEO’s stock awards to volatility of stock price), CEO Firm-related 
Wealth, (natural log of the value of the CEO’s firm-related portfolio), Inst Ownership 
(percentage of the firm owned by institutional investors), and Analyst Coverage (natural 
35 
 
log of the number of analysts forecasting for the firm). (Klein 2002, Richardson and Tuna 
2007, Hribar and Nichols 2007, Zhao and Chen 2008, Ayer et al. 2011, Garett, Hoitash, 
and Prawitt 2014, He 2015). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.  
4.5 PID and Accruals Quality 
DD2002 is the standard deviation of the residuals of the regression used in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002) for 5 years prior to the 
financial report date (i.e., t-4 to t). A lower DD2002 score indicates that the firm’s 
accruals map to past, present, and future cashflows more consistently; although the 
correlation between accruals and cashflows has dropped significantly in recent years 
(Bushman, Lerman, and Zhang 2016), a lower DD2002 score corresponds to better 
financial reporting quality from a capital markets standpoint as this allows for more 
accurate predictions of future cashflows.  
I begin by utilizing an OLS regression of equation 3 utilizing DD2002 as the 
dependent variable. From the results tabulated in Table 4a column 1, the coefficient for 
PID is negative and significant (-0.042, p <0.01), suggesting that the PID between the 
CEO and the board of directors has a positive impact on accruals quality. PID is 
interacted with CEO Chair because the power dynamics between the CEO and the 
directors affect whether PID affects the firm’s behavior. The coefficient for the 
interaction term is insignificant, providing no support that CEO power affects the 
previously documented relationship.  
To help address concerns that omitted variables drive simultaneously higher 
financial reporting quality and higher levels of PID, I undertake regression analyses 
involving the change in DD2002, ΔDD2002, and change in PID, ΔPID. The results of the 
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change regression analysis are tabulated in columns 2 of Table 4a. The coefficient of 
ΔPID is negative (-0.018, p < 0.01), indicating that increases in PID are associated with 
increases in accruals quality.  
I repeat the same analyses with my proxies for financial reporting quality as well. 
The coefficients for PID are negative (-0.011, p = 0.060 for Abn DD2002;  -0.013, p = 
0.089 for ΔAbn DD2002). These results are consistent with the results for DD2002 and 
indicate that PID is associated with better accruals quality and increases in PID are 
associated with increases in accruals quality.  
Table 4a: PID and Financial Reporting Quality – DD2002, Abn DD2002  
  (1) (2) (4) (5) 
 OLS 
Change 
score  OLS Change score  
VARIABLES DD2002 ΔDD2002 
Abn 
DD2002 ΔAbn DD2002 
        
PID -0.042***  -0.011*  
 (-2.78)  (-1.88)  
PID * Ceo Chair 0.024  0.011  
 (1.25)  (1.28)  
ΔPID   -0.018***  -0.013* 
  (-2.91)  (-1.71) 
ΔPID * Ceo Chair  0.011  0.007 
  (0.94)  (0.39) 
CEO Chair -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 (-0.55) (-1.43) (-0.97) (-1.58) 
CEO Ideo 0.013** -0.000 0.005** -0.001 
 (2.06) (-0.33) (2.15) (-0.69) 
Size -0.004 -0.000 -0.003** -0.001 
 (-1.40) (-0.53) (-2.45) (-1.58) 
Leverage 0.028*** 0.006* 0.018*** 0.004 
 (2.59) (1.85) (3.92) (1.21) 
Roa -0.026 -0.006 -0.018 -0.006 
 (-1.22) (-0.61) (-1.26) (-0.49) 
Loss Prop 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.50) (0.38) (0.29) (-1.46) 
Foreign -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (-0.81) (-1.11) (-0.87) (0.66) 
MTB -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
37 
 
 (-0.26) (1.47) (0.73) (0.85) 
Sale Growth 0.010* -0.001 0.005 -0.008** 
 (1.75) (-0.87) (1.39) (-2.35) 
CFO Vol 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (1.03) (1.26) (1.73) (0.57) 
Sale Vol -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.47) (-0.85) (-1.03) (-0.13) 
Ret Vol 0.178*** -0.019 0.035* 0.001 
 (3.15) (-1.34) (1.66) (0.07) 
Big 4 -0.011 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.83) (0.16) (-0.24) (0.17) 
Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.37) (-0.26) (-1.02) (-0.12) 
Busy Board 0.005 0.000 0.002* -0.001 
 (1.31) (0.33) (1.70) (-0.80) 
Board 
Independence 0.019 -0.000 -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.76) (-0.01) (-1.10) (-1.16) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.21) (-1.90) (-0.42) (-0.84) 
CEO Compensation -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (-0.59) (0.65) (0.60) (2.15) 
CEO Delta -0.000* 0.000*** -0.000 0.000* 
 (-1.84) (3.99) (-0.41) (1.70) 
CEO Vega -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.66) (-0.80) (0.25) (0.73) 
CEO Firm-related 
Wealth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.06) (-1.01) (-0.83) (0.24) 
Analyst Coverage -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.89) (-0.40) (-0.61) (-0.05) 
Inst Ownership -0.023** -0.004 -0.014*** -0.004* 
 (-1.98) (-1.55) (-3.32) (-1.65) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3,899 3,781 3,966 3,966 
Adjusted R-squared 0.248 0.020 0.133 0.133 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors clustered at firm level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results for the regressions for DAcc are tabulated in columns 1 and 2 in Table 
4b. The results for DAcc are marginal for the OLS (-0.099, p = 0.116) regressions, and 
not significant for the change regression. This provides marginal support for the 
hypothesis that PID is associated with lower levels of abnormal accruals (significant one-
tailed). 
Table 4b: PID and Financial Reporting Quality – Dacc, F-score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS 
Change 
score  OLS Change score  
VARIABLES Dacc ΔDAcc F-Score ΔF-Score 
        
PID -0.099  0.151  
 (-1.58)  (0.49)  
PID * Ceo Chair 0.155  -0.412  
 (1.31)  (-0.96)  
ΔPID   -0.202  -0.288 
  (-0.96)  (-1.18) 
ΔPID * Ceo 
Chair  0.346  0.285 
  (0.85)  (0.55) 
CEO Chair -0.039 -0.010 0.128 0.000 
 (-1.05) (-0.33) (0.95) (0.00) 
CEO Ideo 0.020 0.024 0.171 0.029 
 (0.63) (0.83) (1.24) (0.77) 
Size -0.014 -0.013 0.208*** 0.059*** 
 (-0.90) (-0.72) (3.44) (2.82) 
Leverage -0.052 -0.079 0.919*** -0.096 
 (-0.93) (-1.35) (3.73) (-0.84) 
Roa -0.047 0.097 -0.640 0.844** 
 (-0.23) (0.40) (-1.30) (2.14) 
Loss Prop 0.006 0.057 -0.703*** 0.107 
 (0.10) (0.73) (-3.00) (0.87) 
Foreign -0.003 -0.040 0.444*** -0.011 
 (-0.11) (-1.51) (3.66) (-0.26) 
MTB -0.002 0.001 -0.017** 0.006 
 (-0.40) (0.21) (-2.13) (1.07) 
Sale Growth 0.101 0.013 2.562*** 0.142** 
 (1.10) (0.76) (12.96) (2.49) 
CFO Vol -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-0.49) (1.09) (-4.87) (-0.84) 
Sale Vol -0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000** 
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 (-0.35) (-0.19) (1.74) (-2.10) 
Ret Vol -0.551 -0.663* -3.598*** 0.362 
 (-1.35) (-1.82) (-3.34) (0.77) 
Big 4 0.099* 0.059 -0.536*** 0.028 
 (1.86) (0.92) (-2.86) (0.33) 
Size 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.002 
 (1.58) (0.93) (0.66) (0.22) 
Busy Board 0.063** 0.039 0.059 -0.016 
 (2.29) (1.48) (0.66) (-0.49) 
Board 
Independence -0.143 -0.204 -0.727 0.295 
 (-0.94) (-1.40) (-1.06) (1.41) 
CEO Tenure -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 0.027 
 (-1.16) (-0.60) (-0.26) (1.44) 
CEO 
Compensation 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.44) (0.35) (-0.81) (-0.56) 
CEO Delta -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
 (-2.46) (-1.61) (0.84) (-2.22) 
CEO Vega -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (-0.06) (-0.64) (2.50) (0.79) 
CEO Firm-
related Wealth 0.005** 0.005* -0.010 0.002 
 (2.07) (1.92) (-0.93) (0.46) 
Analyst 
Coverage -0.002 0.012 -0.426*** -0.118*** 
 (-0.10) (0.44) (-4.97) (-3.19) 
Inst Ownership 0.008 -0.011 0.224 0.049 
 (0.19) (-0.16) (1.33) (0.68) 
     
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3,946 3,846 3,916 3,906 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.090 0.054 0.554 0.038 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors clustered at firm level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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F-Score is a composite score that represents the ex-ante misstatement risk as 
described by Dechow et al. (2011). Dechow et al. (2011) derive this probability score 
through their examination of the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. 
A lower F-Score represents a lower ex-ante probability of a misstatement and thus better 
reporting quality.  
The regression results for F-Score are tabulated in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4b. I 
do not find evidence that PID is associated with lower misstatement risk.  
 Overall, the results suggest a positive relationship between PID and financial 
reporting quality.  
4.6 Other specifications of PID 
 To add more depth to our understanding of the impact of PID on the firm, I 
expand the specification of PID to a total of 8 distinct specifications of PID. 
Recall that the primary measure of PID is defined as: 
𝑃𝐼𝐷 = |(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜 − 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜)| 
I also utilize a second measure of Political Ideology Divergence, Opposite Director, 
defined as follows: 
𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =
𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
 
Where OppositeIdeo is the number of directors that have the opposite ideology from the 
CEO. For example, if the CEO holds a Democratic ideology, while 3 members of the 10 
person board hold Republican ideology, Opposite Director for this firm will be 0.3. If the 
CEO holds a Democratic ideology, the board consists of 3 directors with Democratic 
ideology, and 2 directors with neutral ideology or no donation history, then Opposite 
Director will be 0.  
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Opposite Director assumes that only directors with an opposing ideology will be a 
source of conflict for CEOs with non-neutral political ideologies while neutral directors 
are ambivalent. Therefore, a purely neutral board with a CEO who has a purely 
Democratic ideology will result in 0.5 PID and 0 Opposite Director. This variant of the 
PID measure addresses possible concerns that the matching algorithm flaws resulting in 
directors (with significant political ideologies) who failed to match and are assigned a 
neutral ideology erroneously may be driving the results. 
The Chairman of the Board holds the most influence on the board. Therefore, it is 
possible that personal PID between the CEO and the Chairman has a greater impact on 
the firm than PID between the CEO and other directors. However, there is also a 
selection bias here because this score can only exist when the CEO is not also the 
Chairman of the board. Because of their relationship with the firm, independent directors 
have lower career concerns and higher bargaining power with the CEO (Ryan et al. 
2004). Therefore, it is possible that they are more likely to act on any mistrust caused by 
PID to impose more monitoring on the CEO. Executive directors have more information 
about what happens in the firm than independent directors. In the event where the CEO 
wishes to hide information from shareholders, the CEO would possibly require the 
collusion of executive directors more than the collusion of independent directors.  
Because there can be different sources of political ideological divergence between 
the CEO and the directors of the firm with potentially different impacts on the firm, I 
construct 4 variants of PID, and Opposite Director each with four subscripts as follows: 
1. PID between CEO and the entire board of directors – subscript: Whole  
2. PID between CEO and the Chairman of the Board – subscript: Chairman  
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3. PID between CEO and non-executive (independent) directors – subscript: Non-Ex 
4. PID between CEO and executive directors – subscript: Ex 
For example, the political ideology divergence between the CEO and the whole board 
would be labeled PIDWhole. 
 I apply all 8 specifications of PID to my accruals quality analysis. Results are 
tabulated in Table 5. Table 5 is split into 4 panels. Panel a tabulates the results for 
DD2002; panel b tabulates the results for Abn DD2002. Panel c tabulates the results for 
DAcc and panel d tabulates the results for F-Score. In Columns 1 through 4, the PID 
measure is the main PID measure, while in columns 4 through 8, it is the Opposite 
Director measure.  
Table 5: Various specifications of PID and Financial Reporting Quality 
 Political Ideology Divergence Opposite Director 
Panel a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DD2002 
PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-
ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID -0.042*** 0.007 -0.028*** -0.006 -0.030 -0.006 -0.027* -0.018 
  (-2.78) (0.69) (-2.77) (-0.44) (-1.64) (-0.94) (-1.71) (-1.26) 
CEO Chair -0.004  -0.003 0.005 0.000  -0.001 0.004 
  (-0.55)  (-0.46) (1.04) (0.03)  (-0.11) (0.82) 
PID * CEO Chair 0.024  0.019 -0.035** 0.029  0.034 -0.024 
  (1.25)  (1.26) (-1.99) (1.08)  (1.40) (-1.27) 
            
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,899 1,902 3,899 3,899 3,899 1,902 3,899 3,889 
Adjusted R-squared 0.248 0.281 0.245 0.245 0.243 0.282 0.243 0.245 
         
         
Panel b (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Abn DD2002 
PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-
ex 
PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID -0.011* 0.003 -0.007 0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.009 0.006 
  (-1.88) (0.57) (-1.55) (0.76) (-1.05) (-0.77) (-1.40) (0.84) 
CEO Chair -0.003  -0.002 0.000 -0.001  -0.001 0.000 
  (-0.97)  (-0.67) (0.05) (-0.51)  (-0.63) (0.14) 
PID * CEO Chair 0.011  0.006 -0.001 0.012  0.013 -0.010 
  (1.28)  (0.92) (-0.11) (1.01)  (1.26) (-1.25) 
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Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,966 1,936 3,966 3,966 3,966 1,936 3,966 3,956 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133 0.136 0.133 0.132 0.132 0.137 0.132 0.132 
         
         
Panel c (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DAcc 
PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-
ex 
PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID -0.099 -0.059 0.050 0.119 0.124 -0.019 0.105 0.022 
  (-1.58) (-1.00) (0.91) (1.53) (1.27) (-0.61) (1.24) (0.39) 
CEO Chair -0.039  0.014 -0.002 0.028  0.031 -0.005 
  (-1.05)  (0.38) (-0.09) (1.01)  (1.12) (-0.21) 
PID * CEO Chair 0.155  -0.055 0.032 -0.341**  -0.339** 0.125 
  (1.31)  (-0.54) (0.26) (-2.01)  (-2.22) (1.42) 
            
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,946 1,969 3,946 3,946 3,946 1,969 3,946 3,936 
Adjusted R-squared 0.090 0.083 0.090 0.090 0.091 0.083 0.091 0.090 
         
         
         
         
Panel d (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F-Score 
PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-
ex 
PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID 0.151 0.348* 0.304 -0.665** 0.229 0.225 0.354 -0.104 
  (0.49) (1.71) (1.15) (-2.03) (0.49) (1.52) (0.81) (-0.34) 
CEO Chair 0.128  0.285** 0.003 0.130  0.141 0.032 
  (0.95)  (2.29) (0.03) (1.22)  (1.34) (0.35) 
PID * CEO Chair -0.412  -0.992*** 0.395 -1.214**  -1.249** -0.116 
  (-0.96)  (-2.95) (0.89) (-2.00)  (-2.25) (-0.28) 
            
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,916 1,948 3,916 3,916 3,916 1,948 3,916 3,907 
Adjusted R-squared 0.554 0.549 0.557 0.555 0.555 0.549 0.556 0.554 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
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 Overall, the results remain mostly marginal, but there is some evidence to suggest 
that the main impact that PID has on improving financial reporting quality may be driven 
by PID between the CEO and the non-executive (independent) directors. The results in 
panel a columns 3 and 7 show a negative relationship between PID between the CEO and 
non-executive directors and DD2002, while results in panel c column 7 indicate that PID 
is associated with lower levels of DAcc when the CEO is also chairman of the board. This 
is in line with the idea that independent directors exert stronger monitoring on the CEO’s 
opportunistic behavior, and increased PID makes them more likely induce better 
corporate governance. However, results in panel d column 4 shows that PID between 
executive directors and the CEO can have the positive impact of reducing restatement 
risk. However, the results for F-score remain mixed, with PID between the CEO and the 
independent chairman increasing misstatement risk (panel d column 2), while PID 
between the CEO and the non-executive directors reducing misstatement risk (panel d 
column 4). 
4.7 PID and informational content of earnings announcements 
I also undertake regressions utilizing the abnormal returns (CAR), trading volume 
(Vol), and changes in bid-ask spread (BA), and post earnings announcement drift (Drift) 
surrounding the annual earnings announcement with the previously used control variables 
to investigate the impact of PID on the informational content of earnings announcements, 
measured as the sensitivity of these dependent variables to the amount of earnings 
surprise (Esurp) using the following regression model.       
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𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒௜,௧ =  𝛼
+  𝐸𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝௜,௧൫βଵ +  βଶ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ + βଷ𝑃𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௜,௧ + βସ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௜,௧ + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧൯ + βହ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ + β଺𝑃𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௜,௧
+ β଻𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௜,௧ +  𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧ + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀௜,௧ 
           (4) 
Response is one of the three following measures: CAR (t-1 to t+1 market model adjusted 
abnormal returns), Vol (average trading volume from t-1 to t+1), and BA (change in bid-
ask spread from t-1 to t+1). 
  
46 
 
Table 6: PID and informational content of earnings announcements 
 
Panel a: Cumulative abnormal returns 
3 DAY CAR Political Ideology Divergence Opposite Director Count 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
Esurp -0.675 -1.921 -0.469 -0.683 -0.997 -1.539 -0.847 -0.446 
  (-0.89) (-1.37) (-0.64) (-0.80) (-1.31) (-1.09) (-1.14) (-0.52) 
PID -0.014 0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.000 -0.011 -0.004 0.019** 
  (-1.23) (0.35) (-0.17) (0.52) (0.01) (-1.45) (-0.26) (2.19) 
Pos Earnings 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
  (5.75) (8.15) (7.24) (10.67) (9.44) (7.29) (9.38) (10.71) 
Esurp * PID -0.364 0.058 -0.328 -0.349 -0.696 -0.417 -0.521 -0.841 
  (-1.33) (0.12) (-1.31) (-0.48) (-1.50) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.44) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings 1.751*** 1.331*** 2.010*** 1.415*** 1.621*** 0.849* 1.699*** 1.482*** 
  (3.82) (3.18) (4.13) (4.48) (4.69) (1.91) (4.86) (4.84) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings * PID -0.945 -1.505 -1.800 1.819 -0.978 0.979* -1.448 -0.309 
  (-0.72) (-1.20) (-1.48) (1.22) (-0.61) (1.77) (-1.02) (-0.07) 
           
Other controls and 
interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
with Esurp 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,653 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,641 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.107 0.098 0.096 0.097 0.108 0.097 0.097 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
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Panel b: Trading volume 
Volume Political Ideology Divergence Opposite Director Count 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
Esurp 16.865 94.695 18.869 31.039 18.932 96.115 23.021 28.181 
  (0.39) (1.29) (0.43) (0.72) (0.43) (1.34) (0.54) (0.59) 
PID -0.487 -0.371 -0.211 1.270 0.896 0.231 -0.086 2.284 
  (-0.64) (-0.47) (-0.30) (1.07) (0.71) (0.46) (-0.08) (1.46) 
Pos Earnings -0.246 -0.328 -0.276 -0.310* -0.222 -0.267 -0.292 -0.310* 
  (-0.91) (-1.36) (-1.05) (-1.70) (-1.12) (-1.14) (-1.48) (-1.85) 
Esurp * PID 8.140 22.766 11.599 -27.494 -2.974 -5.680 1.353 -35.387 
  (0.51) (0.90) (0.79) (-0.75) (-0.13) (-0.35) (0.08) (-1.04) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings -5.280 27.978 11.097 18.046 12.783 23.761 15.053 8.724 
  (-0.21) (1.14) (0.45) (1.07) (0.69) (0.78) (0.81) (0.56) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings * PID 69.522 -44.236 9.700 -75.455 10.410 -9.167 -9.138 233.989 
  (1.01) (-0.69) (0.17) (-0.69) (0.10) (-0.19) (-0.11) (0.59) 
           
Other controls and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
with Esurp 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,653 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,641 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152 0.128 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.128 0.152 0.152 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
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Panel c: Bid-ask spread change 
BA Spread Change Political Ideology Divergence Opposite Director Count 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
Esurp -0.000 -0.038 0.004 -0.012 -0.006 -0.040 -0.005 -0.001 
  (-0.01) (-1.01) (0.28) (-0.74) (-0.37) (-1.03) (-0.33) (-0.06) 
PID -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 
  (-0.67) (-0.66) (-1.71) (1.44) (-2.21) (0.41) (-2.18) (0.44) 
Pos Earnings 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.15) (0.64) (-0.66) (1.96) (1.16) (1.50) (1.15) (1.30) 
Esurp * PID 0.004 -0.019* -0.008 0.026** -0.008 0.007 -0.007 0.013 
  (0.86) (-1.90) (-1.32) (2.42) (-0.97) (1.43) (-1.09) (0.98) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings 0.012 -0.016* 0.010 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.93) (-1.70) (0.73) (-0.42) (-0.32) (-0.46) (-0.33) (-0.41) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings * PID -0.055 0.066*** -0.043 -0.011 0.008 -0.003 0.009 0.020 
  (-1.51) (2.85) (-1.24) (-0.53) (0.24) (-0.15) (0.31) (0.83) 
           
Other controls and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
with Esurp 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,653 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,641 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.107 0.098 0.096 0.097 0.108 0.097 0.097 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
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Panel d: Post earnings announcement drift 
+3,+18 Returns Political Ideology Divergence Opposite Director Count 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
Esurp 1.539 2.390 1.386 1.503 1.936 1.082 1.848 2.300* 
  (1.26) (1.27) (1.16) (1.19) (1.58) (0.64) (1.51) (1.83) 
PID 0.004 0.020 0.022** 0.013 0.015 0.006 0.011 0.005 
  (0.33) (1.63) (2.28) (0.99) (0.83) (0.79) (0.72) (0.38) 
Pos Earnings -0.008** -0.007 -0.004 -0.009*** -0.008** -0.011** -0.008** -0.010*** 
  (-2.03) (-1.62) (-0.93) (-3.10) (-2.53) (-2.54) (-2.56) (-3.63) 
Esurp * PID 0.186 1.340* 0.958** 0.474 0.950 1.188*** 0.742 -0.680 
  (0.36) (1.91) (2.28) (0.56) (1.49) (2.84) (1.41) (-0.94) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings 0.336 1.388*** 0.661 0.545 0.773* 1.742*** 0.795** 0.549* 
  (0.76) (3.04) (1.45) (1.64) (1.96) (3.22) (2.00) (1.69) 
Esurp * Pos Earnings * PID 0.927 0.027 -0.168 0.558 -2.357 -1.301 -2.081* 9.241* 
  (0.83) (0.02) (-0.17) (0.26) (-1.57) (-1.47) (-1.66) (1.73) 
           
Other controls and interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
with Esurp 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,653 4,653 2,377 4,653 4,641 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.107 0.098 0.096 0.097 0.108 0.097 0.097 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
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Equation 4 is similar to equation 3. However, Response is the dependent variable, 
and Esurp, and Pos Earnings, are added. Esurp is the amount of earnings surprise 
conveyed by the announcement, defined as the difference between the earnings per share 
(EPS) of a firm and the consensus EPS analyst forecast at the time of the announcement. 
Pos Earnings is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm reported 0 or positive 
earnings, and 0 if the firm reported negative earnings. In this analysis, Esurp is also 
interacted with all of the previously utilized control variables to control for the effect that 
these controls may have on the relationship between market reaction and earnings 
surprise. The results are tabulated in Tables 6 panels a through d. Overall, the coefficients 
are weak and inconsistent for both the PID variables and the interactions between the 
PID variables and Esurp, making them difficult to interpret. Therefore, I am unable to 
draw a conclusion with regards to the impact that PID has on the information content of a 
firm’s earnings announcements.  
4.8 PID and other proxies for Financial Reporting Quality 
 I undertake regression analyses similar to those tabulated in Table 5 (with PID, 
Partisan, and controls) with other characteristics of financial reporting as well. These 
include Fog, the Fog index which proxies for the level of obfuscation in a firm’s 10-Ks 
(Li, 2008), Length, the natural log of the number of words on the firm’s 10-K report, 
Report Lag, the natural log of the number of days between the end of the fiscal year and 
the release of the annual report, and DisAgg, Chen et al., 2015’s measure of reporting 
quality based on the level of disaggregation of their financial statements. The results of 
these regressions are tabulated in Table 7.  
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Table 7: Various specifications of PID and other aspects of financial reporting 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fog  PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID 0.200 0.020 -0.310 -0.035 0.117 0.007 -0.075 0.291 
  (0.47) (0.05) (-0.91) (-0.07) (0.14) (0.03) (-0.10) (0.66) 
CEO Chair 0.161  -0.019 0.121 0.064  0.040 0.111 
  (0.80)  (-0.10) (0.91) (0.46)  (0.29) (0.87) 
PID * CEO Chair -0.286  0.390 -0.501 0.304  0.597 -1.012 
  (-0.49)  (0.84) (-0.85) (0.29)  (0.64) (-1.56) 
           
Observations 2,077 946 2,077 2,077 2,077 946 2,077 2,074 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.081 0.117 0.117 0.116 0.081 0.117 0.117 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Length PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID 0.157 0.100 0.183 0.012 0.356 0.074 0.223 0.412** 
  (0.93) (0.72) (1.31) (0.07) (1.44) (0.83) (1.03) (2.01) 
CEO Chair 0.131*  0.128* 0.082* 0.085*  0.080 0.092** 
  (1.88)  (1.89) (1.86) (1.69)  (1.60) (2.11) 
PID * CEO Chair -0.181  -0.162 0.028 -0.028  0.044 -0.338 
  (-0.84)  (-0.91) (0.13) (-0.09)  (0.16) (-1.21) 
           
Observations 2,065 940 2,065 2,065 2,065 940 2,065 2,062 
Adjusted R-squared 0.162 0.139 0.163 0.162 0.164 0.139 0.163 0.162 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Report Lag PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID 0.024 0.001 -0.009 -0.036 0.018 0.047 0.022 0.025 
  (0.40) (0.03) (-0.19) (-0.55) (0.19) (1.51) (0.28) (0.34) 
CEO Chair -0.024  -0.000 -0.021 0.002  0.001 -0.019 
  (-0.85)  (-0.02) (-1.10) (0.08)  (0.04) (-1.02) 
PID * CEO Chair 0.019  -0.074 0.030 -0.246*  -0.216* 0.000 
  (0.22)  (-1.12) (0.33) (-1.96)  (-1.95) (0.00) 
           
Observations 4,738 2,412 4,738 4,738 4,738 2,412 4,738 4,725 
Adjusted R-squared 0.465 0.492 0.466 0.465 0.468 0.495 0.467 0.464 
         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Disagg PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID 0.007 -0.001 -0.007 -0.011 -0.018 0.000 -0.013 -0.016 
  (0.58) (-0.16) (-0.72) (-0.99) (-1.05) (0.02) (-0.87) (-1.55) 
CEO Chair 0.007  0.003 -0.002 -0.001  -0.000 -0.000 
  (1.38)  (0.75) (-0.49) (-0.15)  (-0.08) (-0.15) 
PID * CEO Chair -0.027*  -0.014 0.026* 0.007  0.003 0.013 
  (-1.72)  (-1.09) (1.76) (0.30)  (0.15) (0.85) 
           
Observations 3,607 1,785 3,607 3,607 3,607 1,785 3,607 3,598 
Adjusted R-squared 0.501 0.556 0.501 0.501 0.502 0.557 0.502 0.501 
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Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
All regressions include industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and controls used in table 4 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
  
The results of these regressions provide some weak support that PID between the 
CEO and executive directors results in longer financial reports that are also more 
disaggregated and more easily readable (marginal one-tailed). In addition, the reporting 
lags for annual reports from firms that have higher levels of PID are shorter.  
4.9 PID and earnings persistence 
 To investigate the impact that PID has on the persistence of a firm’s earnings, I 
undertake regressions of future period earnings on current period earnings interacted with 
PID and control variables using the following model (based on the design used in Li, 
2008):  
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛼 +  𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠௜,௧൫βଵ +  βଶ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧൯ + βଷ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧
+  𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧ + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+  𝜀௜,௧ 
(5)  
Earnings is the operating earnings of a firm scaled by total assets, and in addition to the 
controls used in the previous regressions, I also include control variables utilized by Li 
(2008). The details of these control variables are detailed in Appendix C. Recall that my 
hypothesis is that greater PID is associated with better financial reporting quality. If my 
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hypothesis is supported, then the coefficient of the interaction between Earnings and PID 
should be positive and significant. 
54 
 
Table 8: Various specifications of PID and earnings persistence 
 
 Political Ideology Divergence Opposite Director 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variables PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
Earnings 0.991*** 0.993*** 0.984*** 1.009*** 0.990*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.976*** 
 (6.38) (6.43) (6.37) (6.48) (6.44) (6.40) (6.43) (6.27) 
PID 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.030*** -0.007 -0.029*** -0.002 
  (0.27) (-0.57) (-0.89) (0.49) (-2.59) (-1.14) (-2.84) (-0.12) 
CEO Chair -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.47) (-0.68) (-0.47) (-0.50) (-0.28) (-0.69) (-0.28) (-0.41) 
CEO Ideo -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.50) (-0.58) (-0.68) (-0.56) (-0.79) (-0.16) (-0.80) (-0.61) 
Earnings * PID -0.003 0.033 0.049 -0.067 0.238** 0.029 0.223** 0.076 
  (-0.06) (0.48) (1.00) (-0.77) (2.26) (0.54) (2.47) (0.57) 
Earnings * CEO Chair 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.004 
 (0.24) (0.42) (0.21) (0.25) (0.03) (0.32) (0.01) (0.20) 
Earnings * CEO Ideo -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.008 -0.011 0.009 -0.002 
 (-0.03) (-0.02) (0.06) (-0.00) (0.19) (-0.26) (0.21) (-0.04) 
ACC -0.042* -0.042* -0.042* -0.042* -0.042* -0.042* -0.042* -0.044** 
 (-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-1.90) (-1.89) (-1.92) (-1.98) 
DIV 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (1.33) (1.35) (1.40) (1.42) (1.32) (1.36) (1.33) (1.38) 
Size 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (2.85) (2.86) (2.91) (2.87) (2.90) (2.89) (2.91) (2.86) 
MTB 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (4.97) (4.98) (4.96) (5.01) (5.05) (4.98) (5.07) (4.98) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.86) (-0.82) (-0.86) (-0.82) (-0.71) (-0.76) (-0.69) (-0.84) 
SI -0.019 -0.018 -0.020 -0.019 -0.023 -0.018 -0.023 -0.016 
 (-0.53) (-0.51) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.50) (-0.67) (-0.44) 
Ret_Vol 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.015 
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 (0.68) (0.67) (0.71) (0.65) (0.73) (0.71) (0.75) (0.66) 
Earn_Vol 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.07) (3.11) (3.12) (3.12) (3.18) (3.15) (3.19) (2.91) 
NB_Seg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.12) 
NG_Seg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.11) (1.08) (1.13) (1.14) (1.12) (1.12) (1.11) (1.18) 
Earnings * ACC 0.365** 0.361** 0.361** 0.365** 0.358** 0.358** 0.361** 0.380** 
 (2.25) (2.24) (2.23) (2.25) (2.21) (2.20) (2.23) (2.33) 
Earnings * DIV -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 
 (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.44) (-0.52) (-0.44) (-0.55) 
Earnings * Size 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.26) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) 
Earnings * MTB 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 
 (1.60) (1.62) (1.62) (1.54) (1.57) (1.59) (1.54) (1.64) 
Earnings * Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.19) 
Earnings * SI 0.444* 0.439* 0.453* 0.433* 0.491* 0.438* 0.497* 0.410 
 (1.71) (1.69) (1.75) (1.66) (1.90) (1.69) (1.93) (1.57) 
Earnings * Ret_Vol -0.893*** -0.890*** -0.898*** -0.888*** -0.903*** -0.899*** -0.904*** -0.894*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.13) (-4.18) (-4.11) (-4.19) (-4.17) (-4.20) (-4.10) 
Earnings * Earn_Vol -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 
 (-1.89) (-1.91) (-1.89) (-1.91) (-1.97) (-1.94) (-1.99) (-1.74) 
Earnings * NB_Seg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.23) (0.18) (0.21) (0.26) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24) 
Earnings * NG_Seg -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.30) (-1.28) (-1.31) (-1.33) (-1.26) (-1.31) (-1.25) (-1.36) 
         
Prior Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Earnings * Prior Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 9,296 9,296 9,296 9,296 9,296 9,296 9,296 9,259 
Adjusted R-squared 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Executive Directors 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
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Table 8 tabulates the results of the regressions. Columns 1 through 4 tabulate the 
results from the original PID measures. Neither the main effect of PID nor the 
interactions Earnings * PID are significant.. In columns 5 through 8, where the PID 
variables utilize the count of directors with an opposite ideology, the results are stronger. 
In columns 5 and 7, the interaction Earnings * PID are positive and significant in two-
tailed tests. These results support the idea that having more directors with an opposing 
ideology is associated with increased earnings persistence. In column 8, the interaction 
Earnings * PID  is not significant. Contrasting column 7 and column 8 results indicate 
that ideological differences between the CEO and the non-executive directors have a 
stronger positive impact on financial reporting than ideological differences between the 
CEO and the executive directors. This is in line with the expectation that the non-
executive directors are more likely to respond to personal differences to monitor the CEO 
more, as their primary income is not tied to the firm in which they serve as a director.  
 While persistent earnings are valuable for the investor for the purpose of 
predictability, earnings persistence is not sufficient for the determination of earnings 
quality (Dechow and Shrand, 2004). Managers may enhance the persistence of earnings 
by utilizing earnings management to smooth out earnings. However, previous analyses 
document a positive impact of PID on accruals quality, and in untabulated results, I do 
not find any significant impact of PID on real activities earnings management. Taken 
together, this suggests the positive impact that PID has on earnings persistence may be 
due to an increase in earnings quality rather than an increase in earnings management.    
 Another interesting result from these regressions is the negative and significant 
(two-tailed) coefficients for PID in columns 5 and 7. A negative and significant 
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coefficient means that future (t+1) earnings are lower when there is a higher percentage 
of the board (Whole and Non-Ex) who hold ideologies opposite to that of the CEO. This 
suggests a downside to having directors who hold such opposing ideologies – having 
more PID may result in lower performance. This may be a result of unfriendly board 
members decreasing the efficiency of the advisory role of the board (Adam and Ferreira, 
2007) or the monitoring of the board members resulting in a situation where the CEO’s 
“hands are tied” and reducing the competitiveness of the firm.  
4.10 PID and credibility of management earnings forecasts 
 I undertake regressions utilizing the abnormal returns around a firm’s first annual 
EPS forecast in order to investigate whether market participants react more strongly to 
management earnings forecasts (MEF) from firms with higher PID. I utilize the following 
model (based on the design used by Rogers and Stocken, 2005) and the first MEF for 
each year for firms with PID data for my analysis: 
𝑀𝐸𝐹 𝐶𝐴𝑅௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝑀𝐸𝐹 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠൫βଵ +  βଶ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧൯ + βଷ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧
+  𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧ + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀௜,௧ 
           (6) 
Where MEF CAR is the abnormal returns for t and t+1, MEF News is the amount of news 
conveyed by the MEF, and Controls are a relevant set of control variables. The control 
variables differ from the prior regressions to control for the quality of mandatory 
disclosures and the bundled-ness of these forecasts and are described in detail in 
Appendix D. I utilize a t to t+1 window for MEF CAR to avoid incorporating the effects 
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of information leaked prior to the forecast announcements. 8 I utilize a variation of the 
above regression equation to investigate the impact of PID on the Error (absolute 
difference between guidance and actual EPS) or Bias (directional difference between 
guidance and actual EPS) of a firm’s first MEF forecast. The results of these regressions 
are tabulated in Table 9. β2, the coefficient of the interaction term MEF News * PID is the 
coefficient of interest. 
                                                 
8 Results are similar when CAR (-1, +1) is used instead. 
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Table 9: PID and credibility of Management Earnings Forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  PIDWhole PIDChair PIDEx PIDNon-ex PIDWhole PIDChair PIDEx PIDNon-ex PIDWhole PIDChair PIDEx PIDNon-ex 
Dependent Variables CAR CAR CAR CAR Error Error Error Error Bias Bias Bias Bias 
                         
MEF News 0.109*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.120***                 
  (4.13) (4.58) (4.41) (4.50)                 
PID -0.002 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.30) (0.90) (0.14) (0.22) (0.89) (0.91) (0.59) (0.14) (0.08) (-0.71) (-0.31) (-0.20) 
MEF News * PID 0.053** 0.002 0.027 0.010                 
  (2.42) (0.08) (1.36) (0.25)                 
Horizon 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (3.67) (3.63) (3.71) (3.68) (6.05) (5.97) (6.09) (6.07) (3.73) (3.81) (3.80) (3.88) 
Range -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.039*** 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
  (-2.95) (-2.90) (-2.95) (-2.94) (0.79) (0.86) (0.80) (0.85) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.04) (-0.93) 
BTM -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
  (-3.40) (-3.35) (-3.39) (-3.30) (4.99) (4.83) (4.99) (4.98) (4.20) (4.22) (4.18) (4.29) 
Prev Loss -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
  (-0.98) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-1.06) (6.10) (6.07) (6.12) (6.06) (4.49) (4.51) (4.49) (4.45) 
Bundled 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.82) (1.76) (1.79) (1.77) (-2.68) (-2.73) (-2.69) (-2.67) (-1.09) (-1.07) (-1.09) (-1.12) 
MEF News * Horizon 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000                 
  (1.25) (1.21) (1.16) (1.25)                 
MEF News * Range -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.101***                 
  (-3.67) (-3.71) (-3.60) (-3.63)                 
MEF News * MTB 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.065***                 
  (3.43) (3.40) (3.44) (3.46)                 
MEF News * Prev Loss -0.013 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016                 
  (-0.79) (-0.90) (-0.82) (-0.92)                 
MEF News * Bundled -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.117***                 
  (-6.25) (-6.01) (-6.14) (-6.03)                 
Bundled Esurp 7.598*** 7.481*** 7.738*** 7.352*** 0.650 0.614 0.742 0.557 -0.814 -0.793* -0.779 -0.929** 
  (5.93) (6.27) (5.90) (6.05) (1.38) (1.49) (1.63) (1.37) (-1.51) (-1.72) (-1.55) (-2.08) 
Abnormal Accruals 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.34) (1.29) (1.31) (1.32) (-0.25) (-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.79) (-0.73) (-0.80) (-0.90) 
Bundled Esurp *  -0.271 -0.305 -0.261 -0.286 0.038 0.053 0.041 0.032 -0.150 -0.160 -0.142 -0.102 
Abnormal Accruals (-0.38) (-0.43) (-0.37) (-0.40) (0.16) (0.23) (0.18) (0.14) (-0.68) (-0.73) (-0.66) (-0.48) 
Bundled Esurp * BTM -1.226 -1.230 -1.169 -1.278 -0.382 -0.306 -0.361 -0.425 0.289 0.231 0.309 0.271 
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  (-0.89) (-0.94) (-0.87) (-0.98) (-0.54) (-0.43) (-0.53) (-0.63) (0.35) (0.28) (0.38) (0.35) 
Bundled Esurp * PID -0.714 -0.065 -1.184 2.613 -0.354 -1.399 -0.684 0.478 0.246 1.031 0.051 3.687* 
  (-0.20) (-0.02) (-0.42) (0.61) (-0.25) (-1.02) (-0.72) (0.20) (0.17) (1.02) (0.05) (1.70) 
                         
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                         
Observations 2,572 2,572 2,572 2,572 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 
Adjusted R-squared 0.148 0.146 0.147 0.146 0.217 0.219 0.217 0.216 0.145 0.146 0.145 0.152 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Executive Directors 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
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In columns 1, the coefficient for the interaction term MEF News * PID is 
significant and positive, indicating that abnormal returns are more responsive to the 
earnings news provided by firms with higher PID (between CEO and the whole board – 
column 1, and between CEO and independent directors – column 3). Results tabulated in 
columns 5 to 12, do not show any significant relationship between PID and the accuracy 
or bias of MEFs. This suggests that even though the MEFs provided by a firm with 
higher PID is neither more accurate nor less biased, there is a stronger market response to 
these MEFs. This suggests market participants view MEFs that are released by firms with 
higher PID as being more credible, even though these forecasts may not be higher in 
quality, and hints at the possibility that market participants may be aware of the benefits 
brought about by PID. 
5. Supplementary Analyses 
Numerous extant papers utilize a CEO’s contemporaneous donations to proxy for 
the CEO’s political ideologies (e.g., Gupta and Wowak 2017, Gupta et al. 2017). In this 
section, I investigate CEOs’ donation behavior to determine how appropriate it would be 
to utilize a CEO’s concurrent political donations while in office to proxy for their 
personal political ideologies. The results also yield insight into whether PID is something 
that the CEOs actively react to. 
I use the following regression model to investigate to investigate a CEO’s 
donation behavior while in office (sections 5.1 and 5.2): 
𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  βଵ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ +  βଶ𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧ +  βଶ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜௜,௧
+  𝜆ସ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧ 𝜀௜,௧ 
(8)  
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Donation is the dependent variable of interest, either the political ideology of the CEO’s 
donations (in section 5.1) or the propensity for a CEO to donate (in section 5.2). Control 
variables include previously utilized control variables such as State Ideo and firm 
fundamentals and governance related controls.  
5.1 CEO’s political catering / flexibility 
 CEOs are public figures of a company and situations may arise where they may 
choose to express a political viewpoint that is not fully consistent with their personally 
held beliefs while in office. I measure the political outlook of a CEO’s donations while in 
office, CEO Current Donations in a manner that is identical to how a CEO’s political 
ideology is calculated, but instead of utilizing donations from the 10 years prior to office, 
only each year’s donations are used to calculate each year’s CEO Current Donations 
score. This score is also scaled to range between -0.5 and 0.5. Years in which a CEO does 
not donate are excluded from this analysis (the results are similar when I included years 
in which a CEO does not donate by assigning those years a neutral score of 0).
Table 10: CEO Donations while in office 
 PID Opposite Director Percent 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID -0.077 0.003 -0.026 -0.053 -0.023 -0.013 -0.021 0.014 
  (-1.59) (0.10) (-0.66) (-0.92) (-0.30) (-0.55) (-0.32) (0.26) 
CEO Ideo 0.453*** 0.240*** 0.400*** 0.263*** 0.324*** 0.280*** 0.315*** 0.254*** 
  (3.84) (5.69) (8.58) (8.51) (8.68) (5.76) (8.68) (8.52) 
PID * CEO Ideo -0.544* -0.200** -0.438*** -0.311* -0.662*** -0.162** -0.537*** -0.402** 
  (-1.88) (-2.40) (-3.80) (-1.94) (-2.84) (-2.33) (-2.62) (-2.34) 
State Ideo 0.435*** 0.562*** 0.426*** 0.447*** 0.432*** 0.556*** 0.435*** 0.452*** 
  (7.60) (7.73) (7.56) (7.80) (7.57) (7.58) (7.63) (7.83) 
Size 0.003 0.013 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.004 
  (0.34) (0.90) (0.34) (0.30) (0.26) (0.90) (0.29) (0.34) 
Leverage -0.016 0.002 -0.016 -0.019 -0.014 -0.007 -0.014 -0.022 
  (-0.28) (0.02) (-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.09) (-0.26) (-0.39) 
ROA -0.129 0.008 -0.119 -0.129 -0.135 0.013 -0.133 -0.143 
  (-1.04) (0.05) (-0.95) (-1.06) (-1.10) (0.08) (-1.07) (-1.15) 
Loss Prop -0.049 -0.104 -0.050 -0.043 -0.047 -0.103 -0.046 -0.046 
  (-0.97) (-1.61) (-0.98) (-0.84) (-0.92) (-1.62) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
Foreign 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.007 
  (0.31) (0.15) (0.27) (0.39) (0.22) (-0.07) (0.23) (0.34) 
MTB 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (1.16) (0.33) (1.14) (1.09) (1.01) (0.23) (1.00) (0.93) 
Sale Growth 0.044 0.066 0.043 0.047 0.047 0.064 0.046 0.047 
  (1.21) (1.34) (1.18) (1.31) (1.29) (1.31) (1.26) (1.29) 
Op CF Growth -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.80) (-1.91) (-0.76) (-0.92) (-0.68) (-1.83) (-0.70) (-0.99) 
Sale Volatility -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.67) (0.36) (-0.82) (-0.75) (-0.98) (0.60) (-0.96) (-0.69) 
Return Volatility 0.727*** 0.588** 0.708*** 0.729*** 0.699*** 0.627*** 0.700*** 0.749*** 
  (3.44) (2.41) (3.35) (3.39) (3.28) (2.59) (3.30) (3.47) 
Big 4 0.001 0.081 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.076 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.03) (1.54) (-0.05) (-0.03) (-0.08) (1.47) (-0.09) (-0.04) 
Board Size -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 
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  (-0.01) (-0.17) (0.02) (0.53) (0.18) (-0.37) (0.11) (0.29) 
Busy Board -0.009 0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 0.010 -0.007 -0.006 
  (-0.50) (0.53) (-0.40) (-0.36) (-0.37) (0.47) (-0.38) (-0.36) 
Board Ind % 0.029 -0.245 0.036 -0.014 0.033 -0.226 0.039 0.045 
  (0.21) (-1.61) (0.26) (-0.09) (0.23) (-1.48) (0.28) (0.31) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.017*** -0.019** -0.017** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.020** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
  (-2.59) (-2.25) (-2.48) (-2.67) (-2.72) (-2.38) (-2.70) (-2.72) 
CEO Compensation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.52) (-0.61) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.59) (-0.35) (-0.33) 
CEO Delta -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.69) (-2.46) (-0.71) (-0.89) (-0.83) (-2.39) (-0.81) (-0.81) 
CEO Vega 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (1.42) (-0.34) (1.53) (1.52) (1.53) (-0.33) (1.54) (1.47) 
Log CEO Firm related 
wealth -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.53) (0.77) (-0.68) (-0.54) (-0.48) (0.88) (-0.49) (-0.45) 
Analyst Coverage 0.005 -0.050** -0.000 0.006 0.002 -0.050** 0.002 0.006 
  (0.28) (-2.23) (-0.02) (0.33) (0.13) (-2.22) (0.13) (0.31) 
Inst. Ownership 0.084** 0.077 0.082** 0.077** 0.077** 0.082 0.077** 0.083** 
  (2.23) (1.40) (2.15) (2.05) (2.05) (1.48) (2.04) (2.21) 
                  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,857 1,391 2,857 2,857 2,857 1,391 2,857 2,844 
Adjusted R-squared 0.212 0.249 0.216 0.211 0.213 0.251 0.212 0.212 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
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From the results tabulated in Table 10, we see that a CEO’s donations while in 
office are significantly associated with the political ideology of the state in which the firm 
is headquartered, as well as the CEO’s personal political ideology prior to her service as 
CEO. In addition, we see that PID has a negative impact on the correlation between a 
CEO’s current donations and her political ideology that was determined prior to taking 
office (interaction term PID * CEO Ideo is negative and significant across all 
specifications of PID). Extant literature had operated under the assumption that a CEO’s 
political donation behavior would be consistent with her personal political ideologies. My 
results indicate that this assumption may not always hold true; PID is associated with 
deviations of a CEO’s political donation behavior from her prior ideology towards the 
ideology held by that of the board of directors.  
5.2 CEO’s propensity to make donations while in office  
From the results in Table 11, we see that PID is positively correlated with a CEO 
choosing to make a political donation while in office. The results of tables 10 and 11 
taken together seem to support the possibility of the CEO making donations against her 
political ideology to try to reconcile political differences with an opposing Chairman of 
the Board. Since political ideology can affect working relationships, it is possible that 
CEOs may temper their political views while in office to appear to be less partisan. Taken 
together, this suggests that CEOs may seek a reduction of PID as CEO tenure increases, 
although it is unclear at the moment whether this is due to the CEO selecting directors 
who are agreeable, the CEO updating her political beliefs, the CEO making purely 
strategic donations, or a combination of all three. 
Table 11: CEO’s propensity to donate 
 PID Opposite Director Percent 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
                  
PID -0.076 0.648** -0.029 1.107*** 1.414** 0.467** 1.060** 0.635 
  (-0.21) (2.13) (-0.10) (2.62) (2.53) (2.09) (2.17) (1.28) 
CEO Ideo 0.273 -0.091 -0.018 -0.123 -0.073 0.222 -0.058 -0.133 
  (0.30) (-0.32) (-0.06) (-0.56) (-0.28) (0.58) (-0.22) (-0.63) 
PID * CEO Ideo -0.864 -0.528 -0.168 0.343 -0.202 -1.669*** -0.214 0.770 
  (-0.39) (-0.66) (-0.22) (0.34) (-0.13) (-2.72) (-0.15) (0.63) 
State Ideo -0.420 -0.272 -0.409 -0.362 -0.426 -0.276 -0.434 -0.374 
  (-0.86) (-0.43) (-0.84) (-0.76) (-0.90) (-0.44) (-0.91) (-0.78) 
Size 0.374*** 0.376*** 0.375*** 0.370*** 0.360*** 0.367*** 0.364*** 0.369*** 
  (4.53) (3.91) (4.56) (4.51) (4.34) (3.80) (4.39) (4.45) 
Leverage -0.249 0.155 -0.251 -0.241 -0.293 0.134 -0.289 -0.258 
  (-0.73) (0.39) (-0.73) (-0.71) (-0.85) (0.33) (-0.84) (-0.75) 
ROA 1.073 1.833** 1.078 1.117* 1.123* 1.875** 1.110* 1.074 
  (1.63) (2.19) (1.64) (1.71) (1.71) (2.23) (1.69) (1.61) 
Loss Prop 0.078 -0.197 0.082 0.107 0.090 -0.173 0.090 0.071 
  (0.25) (-0.49) (0.26) (0.34) (0.29) (-0.43) (0.29) (0.23) 
Foreign 0.001 -0.074 0.001 -0.010 0.010 -0.109 0.010 -0.001 
  (0.00) (-0.36) (0.01) (-0.06) (0.06) (-0.54) (0.06) (-0.00) 
MTB 0.032** 0.030* 0.032** 0.031** 0.030** 0.031* 0.031** 0.032** 
  (2.53) (1.76) (2.51) (2.48) (2.38) (1.84) (2.40) (2.52) 
Sale Growth -0.462** -0.797*** -0.461** -0.472** -0.461** -0.815*** -0.459** -0.455** 
  (-2.55) (-3.16) (-2.54) (-2.57) (-2.51) (-3.22) (-2.51) (-2.49) 
Op CF Growth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.33) (-0.48) (-1.35) (-1.39) (-1.40) (-0.42) (-1.38) (-1.31) 
Sale Volatility -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.73) (-1.02) (-0.74) (-0.63) (-0.74) (-0.89) (-0.76) (-0.64) 
Return Volatility -1.184 1.412 -1.168 -1.097 -1.142 1.447 -1.175 -1.141 
  (-0.85) (0.74) (-0.84) (-0.79) (-0.81) (0.76) (-0.84) (-0.82) 
Big 4 0.111 0.179 0.111 0.135 0.113 0.194 0.104 0.120 
  (0.46) (0.54) (0.46) (0.57) (0.47) (0.58) (0.44) (0.50) 
Board Size 0.019 0.047 0.019 0.006 0.019 0.055 0.019 0.017 
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  (0.66) (1.29) (0.67) (0.20) (0.66) (1.50) (0.65) (0.61) 
Busy Board 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.009 -0.001 -0.016 -0.003 0.010 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (-0.01) (-0.10) (-0.02) (0.08) 
Board Ind % -0.810 -1.832* -0.817 -0.057 -0.814 -1.865* -0.772 -0.820 
  (-1.06) (-1.79) (-1.07) (-0.07) (-1.06) (-1.78) (-1.00) (-1.06) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.203*** 0.230*** 0.204*** 0.206*** 0.204*** 0.224*** 0.203*** 0.220*** 
  (4.48) (3.89) (4.47) (4.55) (4.49) (3.74) (4.46) (4.77) 
CEO Compensation -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.40) (0.34) (-0.38) (-0.36) (-0.19) (0.36) (-0.21) (-0.42) 
CEO Delta 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
  (1.71) (0.63) (1.71) (1.70) (1.63) (0.39) (1.62) (1.70) 
CEO Vega -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.85) (-2.12) (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-2.14) (-0.86) (-0.86) 
Log CEO Firm related 
wealth 0.023 0.038* 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.041** 0.023 0.024 
  (1.48) (1.91) (1.46) (1.48) (1.48) (2.05) (1.48) (1.53) 
Analyst Coverage 0.072 0.060 0.070 0.064 0.063 0.091 0.064 0.076 
  (0.55) (0.35) (0.53) (0.49) (0.47) (0.53) (0.48) (0.57) 
Inst. Ownership 0.273 0.754** 0.267 0.280 0.242 0.775** 0.243 0.239 
  (1.00) (2.17) (0.98) (1.04) (0.90) (2.21) (0.90) (0.88) 
                 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,773 2,491 4,773 4,773 4,773 2,491 4,773 4,752 
Pseudo R-square 0.138 0.166 0.138 0.141 0.141 0.169 0.140 0.139 
 
Robust two tailed t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Color Key: 
PID with Whole Board 
PID with Independent Chair 
PID with Non-Executive Directors 
PID with Executive Directors 
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5.3 Evolution of PID over time 
 I also undertake regressions utilizing the following regression model in order to 
investigate whether and how PID evolves through the term of the CEO: 
𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  βଵ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ିଵ +  βଶ𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟௜,௧ +  βଶ𝑃𝐼𝐷௜,௧ିଵ ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟௜,௧
+  𝜆ସ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠௜,௧ 𝜀௜,௧ 
(9)  
Results tabulated in table 12 show that PID has strong autocorrelation. This is not 
surprising due to the nature of how the measure is constructed (recall that the construct of 
the PID variable means that PID only changes when either the CEO or at least one 
member of the board of directors change). In addition, the levels of PID are lower when 
the CEO is the Chair of the board as well. This suggests that CEOs who are more 
influential over the board of directors will tend to influence the selection of incoming 
directors (especially incoming independent directors) who have a lower level of political 
ideology divergence with her.  
The interaction term between PIDt-1 (previous period PID) and CEO Chair is 
positive and significant. This suggests that when the CEO is also the chair of the board, it 
is less likely for PID to be reduced over time. This effect appears to still be in place, but 
less significant for PIDEx (PID between the CEO and executive directors). A possible 
explanation could be that PID concerns may be mitigated by ability concerns when it 
comes to the selection of executive directors. 
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Table 12: Autocorrelation of PID 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PIDWhole PIDChair PIDNon-ex PIDEx 
PIDt-1 0.809*** 0.811*** 0.752*** 0.565*** 
 (55.04) (37.29) (41.23) (16.10) 
CEO Chair 
-
0.028***  -0.018** -0.005 
 (-4.23)  (-2.38) (-1.35) 
CEO Chair * PIDt-1 0.112***  0.063*** 0.080* 
 (6.21)  (2.62) (1.85) 
Previously utilized controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effets Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 4,740 2,412 4,740 4,740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.769 0.643 0.644 0.580 
     
Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered at firm level     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1     
 
  The results documented in sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 suggest that that PID affects 
the CEO, and the CEO actively takes action to reduce the level of PID in the firm through 
the political appeasement by donating to the opposite party or through the selection of 
new directors whose political ideology does not diverge as much from the CEO.   
6. Discussion and limitations, conclusion, and future research 
 In this study, I introduce the construct of PID and, utilizing accruals quality and 
ex-ante misstatement risk, find that PID has a positive impact on a firm’s accruals 
quality. This impact is generally robust to the utilization of a change regression. Overall, 
I find supporting evidence utilizing other proxies for financial reporting quality that PID 
improves a firm’s financial reporting quality, although they are not very strong. Lastly, I 
find that certain stakeholders seem to be aware of PID and react to it: CEOs are more 
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likely to deviate from contribution patterns established prior to their tenure as CEO and 
donate to committees from the opposing party while in office when confronted with 
higher levels of PID. CEOs are also more likely to make political donations while in 
office. Market participants react more strongly to MEFs released by firms with higher 
PIDs, even though these forecasts do not seem to be of a higher quality. In all, PID 
appears to be a construct of significance. PID affects both a firm’s reporting quality and 
the reaction of market participants to a firm’s disclosures.  
6.1 Are results driven by “partisanship” of CEOs? 
 Because PID is highly correlated with the partisanship of CEOs (board ideology 
follows a normal distribution centered around a neutral mean), there is a concern that the 
results documented in this study may just be a result of partisan CEOs rather than 
political ideology differences. To investigate this concern, I run the previous analyses 
replacing the PID variable with a continuous Partisanship variable calculated as the 
absolute political ideology of the CEO. The documented effects persist, but the 
coefficients are smaller, and the statistical significance is weaker. This suggests that the 
impact that partisan CEOs have on financial reporting quality may be due to the conflicts 
that they have with the board of directors and including the directors’ ideologies provided 
a better specification of the construct.  
The idea that the ideological strength of a strongly partisan CEO exerts the same 
influence regardless of ideological alignment requires extreme Democrats and extreme 
Republicans to behave in a similar manner, which runs contrary to the findings of prior 
literature that investigate the impact that a CEO’s political ideology has on firm behavior. 
It is more logical to assume that more strongly politically opinionated CEOs may be more 
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boisterous and have more possibility of conflict with others. In addition, the second 
specification of PID utilized in this paper which uses the percentage of the directors with 
an opposing ideology should not work if the effects captured are not due to personal 
conflicts resulting from divergent political ideologies.  
6.2 PID levels at equilibrium 
 The results of this study demonstrate that increased levels of PID often coincide 
with better financial reporting quality. One concern which may arise is why we do not 
observe an equilibrium in which firms maximize the PID within a firm to enhance the 
reporting quality of a firm. There are a few possibilities for this. First, it may be that the 
equilibrium is not reached. Shareholders and directors may not be consciously aware that 
ideological differences between the CEO and the board of directors may enhance the 
monitoring role and the financial reporting quality of a firm, and thus firms may not 
select for directors who will increase the PID level. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that these stakeholders are aware of the benefits of PID, but CEOs may influence the 
selection of new directors enough to prevent an equilibrium where PID is maximized.  
Second, as the results in section 4.9 demonstrate, there are some downsides 
associated with having greater levels of PID in a firm. Specifically, such divergence in 
opinions may result in lower performance, either through the degradation of the 
efficiency of the advisory role of the board, or through constraining the CEO too much 
resulting in a reduction in the competitiveness of the firm. It is possible that the currently 
observed behavior is a result of tradeoffs between better monitoring and governance and 
lower performance (at least in the short term). 
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Last, in a public firm (especially those without an ideology oriented mission), the 
CEO may be selected on ability and ancillary characteristics rather than political 
ideology, which may be a second or third order concern. 
6.3 Robustness of results 
A limitation of this study may be a possible concern about the robustness of the 
documented results as many of these results become insignificant when firm fixed effects 
are utilized in lieu of industry fixed effects. However, it is possible that this is due to the 
nature of the design utilized. The measures of PID are determined prior to the tenure of 
the CEOs and directors; the PID measure for a firm only changes when either a CEO or a 
director is replaced. This means that there is relatively little within-firm variability in my 
sample. This low within-firm variability may explain why the documented results are not 
generally robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. Also, the inclusion of firm-fixed 
effects may control for firm-level idiosyncrasies that result from the presence of PID in 
the firm, resulting in a collider bias (Gow, Larcker, and Reiss, 2016; Moon, Swanquist, 
and Whited, 2019). 
6.4 Conclusion 
 In this study, I provide the first evidence that differences in personal political 
beliefs between the CEO and the directors of a firm can impact a firm’s financial 
reporting behavior. Although such differences generally affect a firm’s financial 
reporting quality positively, there can potentially be downsides for such increased 
monitoring. CEOs seem to acknowledge such differences and take steps to mitigate them. 
The political landscape within a firm should not be considered to be homogenous, future 
research investigating the effect of mean level of political investigate how the distribution 
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of ideologies (both skewness and kurtosis) and any clustering of such ideologies and the 
differences between clusters can affect firm behavior can yield insight into how 
interpersonal dynamics in a firm stemming from the interaction of individual beliefs can 
affect the aggregate behavior of the organization.  
 Extant literature has shown that independent directors contribute to the reduction 
of agency problems in a corporate setting. The findings of this study contribute to our 
understanding of corporate governance by showing that interpersonal dynamics, such as 
the possibility of a divergence of personal beliefs, can provide a non-monetary incentive 
for directors that improves their ability to reduce agency problems. While the results of 
this study specifically suggests that differences in personal beliefs between the CEO and 
directors can enhance the corporate governance role of the board, holistically, it 
emphasizes the importance of considering how inter-personal factors such as personal 
beliefs, social norms, and culture may affect the efficacy of contracts and the importance 
of such concepts as addenda to extant contract theory.  
6.5 Future Research 
 There is much room for future research in this area. Other measures of financial 
reporting quality including comment letter receipt, earnings relevance, earnings-stock 
price co-movement, and propensity to report internal control weaknesses can be 
investigated. In addition, the impact of PID on other aspects of a firm, such as long-term 
performance, corporate governance, executive compensation, investment efficiency, and 
innovation provide room for more contribution to our understanding of how inter-
personal belief differences among the top decision makers of a firm may affect the 
behavior of the firm. So far, I have documented a mostly beneficial impact of PID on 
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financial reporting quality. However, there are considerable possibilities of downsides as 
well because PID may constrain the information flow between the CEO and the board of 
directors, thus inhibiting board members from fully fulfilling their advisory role. Further 
research along the above-mentioned lines may provide a better understanding of the 
benefits and costs of PID, especially when scrutinizing PID in situations where the need 
for the board’s advice outweighs the need for monitoring. 
Future research can also investigate the impact of ideological differences across 
different entities, such as the impact of PID between the CEO a firm and the CEO of a 
customer / supplier firm, between the CEO and the audit partner in charge of the firm’s 
audits, and between the CEO, the CEO of the target of an M&A, and between the CEO 
and the analyst covering the firm. Such investigations will yield insight into how belief 
differences can affect the working relationship of these different stakeholders of a firm.  
 
 
 
  
76 
 
References 
Abdullah, S. N., Ismail, K. N., & Nachum, L. (2016). Does having women on boards create 
value? The impact of societal perceptions and corporate governance in emerging markets. 
Strategic Management Journal, 37: 466 - 476. 
Adam, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. The Journal of Finance, 217 - 
250. 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance 
and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, (94) 291 - 309. 
Baldassarri, D., & Gelman, A. (2008). Partisans without constraint: political polarization and 
trends in American public opinion. American Journal of Sociology, Volume 114, Number 
2, 408 - 446. 
Barker, V. L., & George, M. C. (2002). CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending. 
Management Science, 48(6): 711 - 820. 
Beasley, M. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Journal, 443 - 465. 
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009). What matters in Corporate Governance? Review of 
Financial Studies Vol. 22(2), 783 - 827. 
Boone, C., Hendriks, W., & Matthyssens, P. (2010). Top management team functional diversity 
and firm performance: The moderating role of CEO characteristis. Journal of 
Management Studies, 48(1): 151 - 177. 
Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2017). Is the internet causing political polarization? 
Evidence from demographics. NBER Working Paper. 
Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The 
ideological-conflict hypothesis: intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science Vol 23(1), 27 - 34. 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison 
pills. Journal of Financial Economics, 35(3): 371 - 390. 
Bruynseels, L., & Cardinaels, E. (2014). The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or 
Personal Friend of the CEO? The Accounting Review, 113 - 145. 
Bushman, R. M., Lerman, A., & Zhang, F. X. (2016). The changing landscape of accrual 
accounting. Journal of Accounting Research, 41 - 78. 
Carcello, J. V., & Neal, T. L. (2000). Audit committee composition and auditor reporting. The 
Accounting Review, 75(4): 453 - 467. 
Chambers, J. R., Schlenker, B. R., & Collisson, B. (2013). Ideology and prejudice: the role of 
value conflicts. Psychological Science, 297 - 307. 
77 
 
Chin, M. K., Hambrick, D. C., & Treviño, L. K. (2013). Political ideologies of CEOs: The 
influence of executives' values on corporate social responsibility. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 58 (2), 197 - 232. 
Christensen, D. M., Dhaliwal, D. S., Boivie, S., & Graffin, S. D. (2015 (36)). Top management 
conservatism and corporate risk strategies: evidence from managers' personal political 
orientation and corporate tax avoidance. Strategic Management Journal, 1918 - 1938. 
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking. . 
Journal of Financial Economics , 79, 431 - 468. 
Coles, J. L., Naveen, D. D., & Naveen, L. (2014). Co-opted Boards. The Review of Financial 
Studies, Volume 27, Issue 6, 1751 - 1796. 
Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002). Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their 
sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, (40) 613 - 630. 
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Larson, C. R., & Sloan, R. G. (2011). Predicting material accounting 
restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research, 17 - 82. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeny, A. P. (1995). Deteching Earnings Management. The 
Accounting Review, 193 - 225. 
Elnahas, A. M., & Kim, D. (2017). CEO political ideology and mergers and acquisitions 
decisions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 146 - 175. 
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of director diversity and firm 
financial performance. Corporate Governance, 102 - 111. 
Fiorina, M. P., & Abrams, S. J. (2008). Political polarization in the American public. Annual 
Review of Political Science, Vol 11, 563 - 588. 
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., Sun, X., & Wu, Q. (2016). CEO political preference and corporate tax. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 37 - 53. 
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., Sun, X., & Wu, Q. (2016). CEO political preference and corporate tax 
sheltering. Journal of Corporate Finance, 37 -53. 
Gelles, D. (2017, 08 19). The moral voice of coporate America. The New York Times, pp. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/19/business/moral-voice-ceos.html. 
Gerber, E. R., Henry, A. D., & Lubell, M. (2013 ). Political homophily and collaboration in 
regional planning networks. American Journal of Political Science, 57(3): 598 - 610. 
Guner, A. B., Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Financial expertise of directors. The 
Accounting Review, 77(1): 71 - 105. 
Gupta, A., & Wowak, A. J. (2017 62(1)). The elephant (or donkey) in the boardroom: how board 
political ideology affects CEO pay. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1-30. 
Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., & Hambrick, D. C. (2017). Red, blue, and purple firms: organizational 
political ideology and corporate social responsibility. Strategic Management Journal 38, 
1018 - 1040. 
78 
 
Ham, C., Lang, M., & Wang, S. (2017). CFO Narcissism and Financial Reporting Quality. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 55(5): 1089 - 1135. 
Hetherington, M. J. (2009). Putting Polarization in Perspective. British Journal of Political 
Science, 413 - 448. 
Hoitash, U. (2011). Should independent board members with social ties to management disquality 
themselves from serving on the board? Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 99, Issue 3, 
399 - 423. 
Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. (2010). Corporate policies of Republican managers. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1279 - 1310. 
Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. (2015). Political values, culture, and corporate litigation. 
Management Science, 2905 - 2925. 
Hwang, H.-W., Rose-Green, E., & Lee, C.-C. (2012). CEO age and financial reporting quality. 
Accounting Horizons, 26(4): 725 - 740. 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failture of internal control 
systems. Journal of Finance, 881 - 880. 
Kandel, D. B. (1978). Homophily, selection, and socialization in adolescent friendships. 
American Journal of Sociology, 84(2): 427 - 436. 
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate diurector and 
board independence. Review of Financial Studies, 26(2): 1561 - 1605. 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 163 - 197. 
Kowitt, B. (2018). CEOs weigh in on social issues and when to get political. Retrieved from 
Fortune.com: http://fortune.com/2018/06/26/ceos-politics-social-issues-leadership/ 
KRC Research and Weber Shandwick. (2016). The dawn of CEO activism. Retrieved from Weber 
Shandwick website: https://www.webershandwick.com/uploads/news/files/the-dawn-of-
ceo-activism.pdf 
Krishnan, G. V., Raman, K. K., Yang, K., & Yu, W. (2011). CFO / CEO - board social ties, 
Sarbanes - Oxley, and earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 537-557. 
Krishnan, J., Wei, Y., & Zhao, W. (2002). Legal expertise on corporate audit committees and 
financial reporting quality. The Accounting Review, 86(6): 2099 - 2130. 
Lee, J., Lee, K., & Nagarajan, N. J. (2014). Birds of a feather: value implications of political 
alignment between top management and directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 
112(2): 232 - 250. 
Li, F. (2008). Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 221 - 247. 
McGregor, J. (2016, June). CEOs are getting more political, but consumers aren’t buying it. 
Retrieved from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-
79 
 
leadership/wp/2016/06/30/ceos-are-getting-more-political-but-consumers-arent-buying-
it/?utm_term=.c1b5f7ae18dd 
Pew Research Center. (2017). Far more Americans say there are strong conflicts between 
partisans than other groups in society. Retrieved from Pew Research Center website: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/19/far-more-americans-say-there-are-
strong-conflicts-between-partisans-than-between-other-groups-in-society/ 
Richardson, S. A., Sloan, R. G., Soliman, M. T., & Tuna, I. (2005). Accrual reliability, earnings 
persistence, and stock prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 437 - 485. 
Rogers, J. L., & Stocken, P. C. (2005). Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting 
Review, 1233 - 1260. 
Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2013). Bundled forecasts in empirical accounting research. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43 - 65 . 
Ryan, H. E., & Wiggins, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board 
independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics , 
73(3): 497 - 524. 
Sears, D. O., & Funk, C. L. (1999). Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults' political 
predispositions. The Journal of Politics, 61(1): 1-28. 
Shivadasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 16(1): 167 - 198. 
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Mitchell, M. (1994). In-group identification, social dominance 
orientation, and differential intergroup allocation. The Journal of Social Psychology Vol 
134(2), 151 - 167. 
Srinidhi, B., Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. (2014). Female director and earnings quality. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 28(5): 1610 - 1644. 
Verhulst, B., Eaves, L. J., & Haterni, P. K. (2012). Correlation not causation: the relationship 
between personality traits and political ideologies. American Journal of Political Science, 
56(1), 34 - 51. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal Financial Economics, 20: 
431 - 460. 
Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1995). Who shall govern? CEO / board power, demographic 
similarity, and new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 40, No.1, 60 
- 83. 
 
 
  
80 
 
Appendix A – Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
 Political Ideology Divergence variables 
PID Political ideology divergence between the CEO and the board of 
directors, as defined in detail in the paper. 
ΔPID Percentage change in PID calculated as (PIDt – PIDt-1) / PIDt-1 
PIDWhole Political ideology divergence between the CEO and the board of 
directors, identical to PID. 
Opposite 
DirectorWhole 
Percentage of the board of directors who hold political ideology 
divergent from that of the CEO 
PIDChair Political ideology divergence between the CEO and the Chairman of 
the board, if the CEO is not also the Chairman 
Opposite 
DirectorChair 
Indicator that equals 1 if the independent Chairman is of an opposing 
political ideology to the CEO and 0 otherwise 
PIDNon-ex Political ideology divergence between the CEO and non-executive 
directors 
Opposite 
DirectorNon-Ex 
Percentage of non-executive directors who hold political ideology 
divergent from that of the CEO 
PIDEx Political ideology divergence between the CEO and executive 
directors 
Opposite 
DirectorEx 
Percentage of executive directors who hold political ideology 
divergent from that of the CEO 
CEO Ideo CEO’s political ideology. 
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 Financial reporting quality dependent variables 
DD2002 Standard deviation of residuals of the Dechow Dichev 2002 model 
over the previous 5 years from the t-4 to t 
ΔDD2002 Percentage change of DD2002, calculated as (DD2002t – DD2002t-1) / 
DD2002t-1 
Abn DD2002 Absolute value of the deviation of the residuals of the Dechow Dichev 
2002 model from the 2 digit SIC mean. 
ΔAbn 
DD2002 
Percentage change of Abn DD2002, calculated as (Abn DD2002t – 
Abn DD2002t-1) / Abn DD2002t-1 
DAcc Discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones Model 
ΔDAcc  Percentage change of DAcc, calculated as (DAcc t – DAcc t-1) / DAcc t-
1 
CAR Three day (t-1 to t+1) market model adjusted abnormal returns 
F-Score F-Score as calculated by Dechow et al. 2011. Details provided in 
Appendix B 
ΔF-Score Percentage change in F-Score calculated as (F-Scoret – F-Scoret-1) / F-
Scoret-1 
Fog Fog (readability) Index as calculated in Li 2008 
Length Natural log of the number of words in the annual report 
Report Lag Natural log of the number of days between the end of the fiscal year 
and the release of the annual report 
DisAgg Disaggregation score as calculated in Chen et al. 2015 
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 Control and other variables 
Analyst 
Coverage 
Natural log of the number of analysts forecasting for the firm for the 
year 
Big 4 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm uses a Big 4 auditor and 0 
otherwise. 
Board Ind % Percentage of the board of directors who are independent 
Board Size Number of directors on the board of directors 
Busy Board Dummy variable that equals 1 if more than half of the board of 
directors are simultaneously on at least 3 boards. 
Cash Vol Standard deviation of cashflow from operations (OPCFO) over the 
previous 5 years from t-4 to t. 
CEO Chair Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the Chairman of the board 
and 0 otherwise. 
CEO 
Compensation 
Natural log of the total compensation of the CEO. 
CEO Delta Sensitivity of CEO’s stock awards to stock price 
CEO Vega Sensitivity of CEO’s stock awards to stock price volatility 
CEO Tenure Natural Log of the number of months that the CEO has been in office. 
Esurp Earnings surprise at the time of the annual earnings announcement 
calculated as the difference between EPS and the consensus estimate 
for EPS that is closest to, but before the announcement date. 
Foreign Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has foreign operations and 0 
otherwise. 
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Inst Holdings Percent of the firm which is owned by institutional investors as 
determined by 13f filings 
Leverage Leverage of a firm, calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets 
Loss Prop Proportion of the 5 years prior to financial statement date (t-4 to t) in 
which the firm reported a loss. 
MTB Market to book ratio calculated as the market value of equity divided 
by book value of equity 
Partisan Indicator variable that equals 1 if the absolute magnitude of the CEO’s 
ideology is in the top quintile of all CEOs. This ranking is done by 
year.  
Ret Vol Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous 5 years 
from t-4 to t 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by average total assets 
Rsst Acc Accruals measure defined in Richards et al. 2005 which extends the 
working capital portion to include changes in non-operating assets and 
liabilities. Detailed definition provided in Appendix B.  
Sale Growth Percentage growth in sales from the previous year 
Sale Vol Standard deviation of sales over the previous 5 years from t-4 to t 
Size Natural logarithm of the total assets in year t 
State Ideo State Ideo is calculated as the total donation amounts donated by the 
residents of the state in the year to Democratic candidates and 
committees divided by the total donated to both Democratic and 
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Republican committees, transformed to range from -0.5 (100% 
Democratic) to 0.5 (100% Republican).  
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
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Appendix B:  
Definition of DD2002 
DD2002 is defined for each firm as the standard deviation of the residuals of the 
following regression used in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols 
(2002) for 5 years prior to the financial report date (i.e. t-4 to t).  
𝛥𝑊𝐶௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  βଵ𝑂𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ + βଶ𝑂𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂௜,௧ + βଷ𝑂𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂௜,௧ାଵ  + βଷ𝛥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒௜,௧
+ βସ𝑃𝑃𝐸௜,௧  + 𝜀௜,௧ 
Where ΔWC is the change in working capital accruals, defined as Δ Accounts Receivable 
+ Δ Inventory – Δ Accounts Payable – Δ Tax Payable + Δ Other assets, OpCFO is 
cashflow from operations, ΔSale is change in sales revenue, and PPE is the net value of 
property, plant, and equipment.  
Definition of Abn DD2002 
Abn DD2002 is calculated for each firm using the current year residuals of the following 
regression used in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols (2002). 
𝛥𝑊𝐶௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  βଵ𝑂𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ + βଶ𝑂𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂௜,௧ + βଷ𝑂𝑝𝐶𝐹𝑂௜,௧ାଵ  + βଷ𝛥𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒௜,௧
+ βସ𝑃𝑃𝐸௜,௧  + 𝜀௜,௧ 
Where ΔWC is the change in working capital accruals, defined as Δ Accounts Receivable 
+ Δ Inventory – Δ Accounts Payable – Δ Tax Payable + Δ Other assets, OpCFO is 
cashflow from operations, ΔSale is change in sales revenue, and PPE is the net value of 
property, plant, and equipment. A larger Abn DD2002 implies a greater deviation from 
industry averages. 
Abn DD2002 is defined as the absolute value of the difference between a firm’s residuals 
is and the mean residuals for each firm in the same 2 digit SIC industry in the same year. 
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A similar measure is used in Dechow et al. 2011. A larger Abn DD2002 implies a greater 
deviation from the industry norms in terms of cashflow relevance of accruals. 
Definition of F-Score 
F-Score is the composite score that represents the ex-ante misstatement risk as calculated 
in Dechow et al. (2011). It is defined as 
𝐹 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  𝑒ି଻.ଽ଼ଷ + 𝑒଴.଻ଽ଴ ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇 𝐴𝑐𝑐 + 𝑒ଶ.ହଵ଼ ∗ Δ𝑅𝑒𝑐 + 𝑒ଵ.ଵଽଵ ∗ Δ𝐼𝑛𝑣 +  𝑒ଵ.ଽ଻ଽ
∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑒଴.ଵ଻ଵ ∗ Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝑒ି଴.ଽଷଶ ∗  Δ𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝑒ଵ.଴ଶଽ ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 
Where RSST Acc are the accruals measure defined in Richardson et al. 2005, ΔRec is the 
change in receivables, ΔInv is the change in inventory, Soft Assets is the percentage of 
total assets that are soft assets, ΔCash Sale is the change in cash sale percentage, ΔROA is 
the change in return on assets, and Issue is an indicator that equals 1 if the firm issues 
debt or equity in this year. The coefficients are based on the coefficients derived in 
Dechow et al. 2011. A higher F-Score proxies a higher risk of financial statement 
manipulation and thus restatement risk.  
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Appendix C: Variable description for Section 4.8 
The table below provides detailed descriptions for the variables utilized in Section 4.9. 
The descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Table 1c.  
Variable Definition 
Earnings Operating earnings of the current period defined as operating income 
after depreciation scaled by total assets. 
ACC Accruals calculated as operating income after depreciation – operating 
cashflow, scaled by total assets. 
DIV Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has dividends for the year 
and 0 otherwise 
Size Natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity 
MTB Market to book ratio 
Age Age of firm defined by first date that firm appears in the CRSP 
database. 
SI Special items scaled by total assets 
Ret_Vol Volatility of monthly returns in the last year 
Earn_Vol Volatility of annual operating earnings over the last 5 fiscal years 
NB_Seg Number of business segments 
NG_Seg Number of geographic segments 
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Appendix D: Variable description for Section 4.9 
The table below provides detailed descriptions for the variables utilized in Section 4.9. 
The descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Table 1b. 
Variable Definition 
MEF News Amount of information provided by the MEF calculated as the 
difference between the upper bound of the MEF and analyst consensus 
at the time of the forecast. If the earnings forecast was bundled with an 
earnings announcement, then the analyst expectations are adjusted 
according to the process utilized in Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013. 
Horizon Number of days between the MEF date and the actual fiscal year end. 
Range Range of the forecast defined as the difference between the upper and 
lower limits of a ranged forecast divided by the mean. Point forecasts 
have a range of 0. 
BTM Book to market ratio of the quarter in which the forecast was made. 
Prev Loss Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firms reports a loss for the 
quarter prior to the quarter in which the MEF was made. 
Bundled Indicator variable that equals 1 if the MEF was bundled with an 
earnings announcement 
Bundled 
Esurp 
Amount of earnings surprise of the bundled earnings announcement. 
Unbundled announcements have 0 Bundled Esurp. 
Abnormal 
Accruals 
Abnormal accruals calculated using the Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) 
 
